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Abstract
This thesis aims to discover the mechanisms o f imitation by testing the predictions of 
three theories. These are Associative Sequence Learning Theory (Heyes and Ray, 
2000), Ideomotor Theory (e.g. Prinz, 1997), and Active Intermodal Mapping (e.g. 
M eltzoff & Moore, 1997). Chapter 1 identifies three issues upon which the theories of 
imitation can be differentiated. The first is concerned with the development of 
effector-dependent representations through observation. The second and third relate to 
the role o f awareness and experience in imitation. These differences form the basis of 
the experiments reported in Chapters 2, 3 and 4.
Experiments 1 - 3  (Chapter 2) investigated whether effector-dependent 
representations could be formed through action observation. A series o f tests based on 
the serial reaction task (SRT) were utilised. It was found that with relatively short, 
simple movement sequences, participants learned the structure o f the sequence as 
effector-dependent motor representations. Sequence knowledge could not be 
expressed using effectors other than those used by the observed model.
Experiments 4 - 6  (Chapter 3) used similar tests to those in Chapter 2 but investigated 
whether a longer, more complex, movement sequence could be learned implicitly i.e. 
without concurrent awareness. Two experiments suggested that observation o f a 
movement sequence, but not inanimate stimuli, could support implicit learning.
Experiments 7 and 8  (Chapter 4) investigated the role o f experience in imitation. It 
was shown that while responses made to movement stimuli were faster when stimulus 
and response movements matched, compared to when they were different, the 
advantage for matching movements disappeared after incompatible training. This 
result supports an experience-based, rather than innate, view o f imitation.
The results o f the experiments reported in this thesis suggest imitation is experience- 
based, supports effector-dependent learning by observation, and can operate without 
awareness. This combination is best described by Associative Sequence Learning 
Theory.
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1.1 What Is Imitation?
The term imitation has been used to describe a number o f reported behaviours in the 
literature on human learning. A common feature o f all o f these conceptualisations of 
imitation is that something is copied, and in the field o f human movement imitation, 
that some aspect o f a model’s movement is copied by an observer o f the movement. 
Two defining features make movement imitation worthwhile for study, and 
distinguish imitative movement from action in response to inanimate external stimuli. 
These features can be seen in the following example. If  one imagines a tennis coach 
demonstrating a serve to a novice, one realises that in order for the demonstration to 
be of any use, the visual representation o f the coach’s serve must be utilised in some 
way so as to produce motor commands which are the same as those performed by the 
coach. This is the first defining feature o f imitative movement: motor commands are 
derived from perceptual representations. The foundation o f the ability to produce 
matching motor commands from perceptual input is an issue o f great theoretical 
debate.
The second defining feature is one of perspective. If  the novice successfully imitates 
the coach’s action the two actions will not ‘match’ from the novice’s perspective. The 
novice will perceive the coach’s actions as a whole body movement, albeit primarily 
o f one arm moving in an overhead arc, while their own actions will be perceived as a 
movement o f their arm and hand to hit the ball. Similarly, the coach may be able to 
tell that the novice’s action matched the movement they had demonstrated, even 
though the visual information they received from their own movement and that o f the 
novice differed greatly. For some kinds o f imitative actions, movements will not
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match from the perspective o f either the model or the imitator, but only from a third- 
person perspective.
These two features o f imitative movement have been described in the movement 
imitation literature as posing the ‘correspondence problem’ (Alissandrakis, Nehaniv, 
& Dautenhahn, 2002; Nehaniv and Dautenhahn, 2002). The correspondence problem 
occurs when matching motor output must be produced from perceptual information. 
Two seemingly incommensurate codes, one o f patterns o f stimulation received 
through the distal senses and the other of muscle contractions, must be made 
comparable. The problem is made more difficult when simple perceptual matching 
cannot be used, due to dissimilar perceptual feedback received from executing and 
observing the action. These ‘perceptually opaque’ actions (Heyes and Ray, 2000) are 
commonly whole body, or facial movements, which are not available for visual self- 
monitoring. These movements, when imitated, match from a third-person perspective 
but not from the perspective o f either the imitator or the individual being imitated. 
Perceptually opaque actions are contrasted with ‘perceptually transparent’ actions in 
which feedback gained from action execution and observation is similar. Hand 
movements, for example, give rise to extremely similar visual percepts, if  the 
orientation o f the observer and model are matched.
In the literature on adult humans (but not in the developmental or comparative 
literatures), imitation is more commonly known as “observational learning” when the 
imitated movements were not previously part of the observer’s skill repertoire. This 
chapter reviews a number o f studies which are described as experiments on 
observational learning o f motor skills (e.g. Kelly and Burton 2001). These studies
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investigate learning by imitation, or the imitation o f novel movement sequences. 
Experiments are also presented in this chapter in which participants are not trying to 
imitate observed movements, and in some cases to perform the opposite movement 
(e.g. Brass, Bekkering & Prinz 2001). These experiments investigate the effect o f 
action perception on the planning and performance o f action and typically find that 
observation o f an action primes the same movement in the observer. This finding is 
relevant to work on imitation; if  an imitative action is prepared upon action perception 
then the correspondence problem has been solved, the observer needs only to execute 
the prepared movement to perform an imitative movement.
This review is concerned with three theories o f imitation which attempt to solve the 
correspondence problem for both perceptually opaque and perceptually transparent 
actions. The theories are outlined in Section 1.2 and then evaluated in Sections 1.3 
and 1.4. Section 1.3 focuses on two main points o f agreement between the theories. 
The first relates to the formation o f action representations from perceptual and motor 
representations (Section 1.3.1). The second is the common prediction that motor skills 
should be able to be learned through observation (Section 1.3.2). Section 1.4 
considers three differences between the theories. These differences form the basis for 
the empirical work presented in chapters 2, 3 and 4. The main conclusions from the 
empirical work presented in this review are summarised in Section 1.5.
4
1.2 Theories of Imitation
Three theories o f imitation shall be described, the Associative Sequence Learning 
model (Heyes and Ray 2000; Heyes, 2001, Section 1.2.1), Ideomotor Theory (e.g. 
Prinz 2002, 1997, Section 1.2.2), and the Active Intermodal Mapping model (e.g. 
M eltzoff&  Moore 1977, 1994,1997, Section 1.2.3).
1.2.1 The Associative Sequence Learning Model of Imitation
The Associative Sequence Learning (ASL) model posits that imitation is a result o f 
general associative learning mechanisms. Associative theories of imitation prior to 
ASL can be split into those that assume that associations underlying imitative ability 
are formed through contiguous occurrence o f stimuli and responses (e.g. Allport,
1924; Guthrie, 1935; Holt, 1931); and those that assume reward must follow 
presentation o f stimulus and response for the two to become associated (e.g. Miller & 
Dollard, 1941; Skinner, 1953). Both types o f theory are excluded from the present 
discussion o f the correspondence problem as the theories either argue that the 
correspondence problem is never solved (by denying the possibility o f novel imitation 
o f perceptually opaque actions), or provide an insufficiently detailed description of 
key imitative mechanisms (e.g. Holt, 1931; see Heyes, 2000 for a review).
In contrast to these theories, ASL suggests that the correspondence problem is solved 
through bidirectional associations between perceptual and motor representations o f an 
action. Perceptual representations are formed when another individual’s action is 
perceived and contain information received through the distal senses. Motor
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representations contain motor commands needed to perform the action and 
somatosensory information received when the movement is performed (i.e. what it 
feels like to perform the action).
These associations, or excitatory links, produce co-activation o f perceptual and motor 
representations o f an action whenever either is activated. When the perceptual 
representation activates the associated motor representation, imitation becomes 
possible. The associations are formed in a Hebbian fashion when perceptual and 
motor representations are repeatedly activated at the same time. An increasing number 
o f contiguous activations will lead to an increasingly strong association between the 
two representations. Associations formed through the co-activation o f perceptual and 
motor representations are known as direct vertical links.
Associations between motor and perceptual representations (“vertical links”) can also 
be formed indirectly when associations are separately formed between perceptual and 
motor action representations with a third representation. Through the common 
association, the perceptual representation becomes indirectly associated with the 
motor representation. The most obvious example o f this process would be language. If 
an individual hears the word “kick” whenever they see someone perform a kicking 
action, the word “kick” will become associated with the perceptual representation of 
kicking. If the individual also hears the word kick when they perform a kicking 
action, the word “kick” will become associated with the motor representation of 
kicking. In this way the perceptual representation o f a kicking action will be 
associated indirectly with the motor representation through the word “kick”. Co­
activation o f perceptual and motor representations through indirect vertical links
6
would quickly produce direct vertical links, i.e. activation of one representation would 
produce activation of the other without the necessity for intermediate phonetic or 
semantic activation.
Vertical links can explain the imitation o f actions for which the individual already has 
perceptual and motor representations (i.e. the actions are familiar). To explain 
imitation o f novel actions, Heyes and Ray (2000) invoke the idea that novel 
movements are composed o f familiar movements, or movement primitives, arranged 
in a novel sequence. Observation o f a novel movement sequence prompts two 
processes. The first is a perceptual process which decomposes novel action sequences 
into their constituent primitives. Horizontal links are formed between these perceptual 
primitives to form the representation o f the overall sequence. The second process 
occurs when perceptual representations activate associated motor representations 
through vertical links. Motor representations will be activated in the same order and 
with the same temporal sequence as the perceptual representations. Activation o f the 
motor representations will enable the observed novel movement sequence to be 
executed by the observer. The extent to which the executed act will be a faithful copy 
o f the observed action will depend on the proportion o f movement primitives that 
have associative links between their perceptual and motor representations.
The ASL model does not specify a system which compares perceptual and motor 
representations o f matching movements. The individual does not have to ‘decide’ that 
representations are o f the same action. It is possible for associative links to be formed 
between perceptual and motor representations which do not match from a third-person 
perspective. The reason why associations are more likely to be formed between
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matching rather than non-matching movements is due to the environment. Heyes (in 
press) argues that activations are formed only when representations are activated 
contiguously, and that the environment o f human development is constructed so that 
matching perceptual and motor action representations are more likely to be 
contiguously activated than non-matching representations.
Although it is more likely that non-matching movements will be performed at any 
time between two individuals, the range o f possible non-imitative actions is so much 
larger than that o f imitative actions. Thus, associations between specific non-matching 
actions are unlikely to be formed. Matching associations are more common due to the 
use o f mirrors for example.
In summary, ASL suggests that imitation is accomplished through bidirectional 
associations between perceptual and motor action representations. These associations 
are formed when perceptual and motor representations are activated contiguously. 
Observation o f an action leads to the activation o f a perceptual representation. The 
associated motor representation is then also activated, and the action can be 
performed.
1.2.2 Ideomotor Theory
The ideomotor theory o f imitation (e.g. Brass, Bekkering, & Prinz, 2001; Brass, 
Bekkering, Wohlschlager, & Prinz, 2000; Prinz, 1997, 2002) is based on Greenwald’s 
(1970a; 1970b) extension o f the ideomotor theory o f action (James, 1890). James 
argued that, “Every representation o f a movement awakens in some degree the actual
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movement which is its object" (James, 1890, p. 1134); suggesting a model o f action 
control in which the idea, or mental representation, o f a movement is sufficient to 
cause its execution without any further need for volition. Greenwald extended this 
concept to include two central claims; that actions are mentally represented in terms 
o f their perceptual effects, and that these effect representations are used to control 
action production (Greenwald, 1970a; 1970b. Prinz (1997) argued that ideomotor 
theory provides a useful framework to understand imitation as it demonstrates how 
action perception may prompt the production of a matching movement.
Ideomotor theory is distinguished from traditional models o f perception and action in 
which perceptual and action codes are separate (e.g. Massaro, 1990; Sanders, 1980; 
Welford, 1968). Separate coding theories assume that sensory representations are 
fundamentally different from motor representations. The challenge for these theories 
is to specify the translation or transformation which enables a matching motor 
response to a perceptual event. Ideomotor theory, in specifying that perception and 
action share a common representational framework, does not need to specify a 
mechanism for translation o f motor and perceptual representations.
Under ideomotor theory, actions are represented in terms of their sensory 
consequences, enabling information received through the senses to be matched to 
sensory consequences contained in action representations. Action representations can 
therefore be used to control action production by comparing expected sensory 
feedback with actual sensory feedback (see Wolpert & Kawato, 1998). The usefulness 
o f this system with regard to imitation is obvious. Sensory consequences o f a model’s 
actions can be directly mapped onto a ‘motor’ representation which is coded in terms
9
of its sensory effects. This representation is then used to initiate and control imitative 
behaviour in the observer.
A perceptual stimulus activates the action representation with which it exhibits the 
most ideomotor similarity. Ideomotor similarity refers to the degree to which features 
o f a stimulus correspond to sensory features produced by particular actions. As 
actions are represented in terms of their perceptual effects, perceptual input can be 
compared directly with the action representation.
This process can be illustrated through imitation o f a kicking movement. Visual 
information received when a kicking action is observed will activate any action 
representation with which it shares some degree o f ideomotor similarity. The action 
representation which exhibits the greatest degree o f similarity will be activated most 
strongly, and in the majority o f cases this will be the ‘kicking’ action representation. 
When an action representation is activated, the individual will perform the action 
without the need for any further volition unless the action is actively inhibited.
Ideomotor similarity does not only arise as a result o f simple, visual matching 
between percepts and action effects. It can also arise as a result o f high level cognitive 
features. For example, tones and actions can exhibit ideomotor similarity, if  they 
share a common feature such as emanating from/being directed toward the same 
region o f space. This similarity may be based on the common effect o f the tone and 
the action to orient the individual’s attention to a particular region o f space. Ideomotor 
compatibility may also be based on symbolic features when a stimulus feature 
symbolises an action. For example, if  a high-pitched tone is produced in response to
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hand opening, and a low-pitched tone in response to hand closing, then the respective 
tones will share ideomotor similarity with the actions they represent. The tone is 
included in the ideomotor representation as one o f the action’s sensory consequences.
In summary, the ideomotor theory of imitation is based on the idea that there are 
certain higher-level, late perceptual representations which share a common 
representational system with early action goal representations. In this common 
representational system, actions are represented in terms o f their sensory 
consequences. Under this system, perceptions of actions activate the action 
representation which has the greatest degree o f similarity in terms o f expected sensory 
consequences in the observer. The degree o f similarity is not limited by low-level 
spatial features, but is also influenced by higher-order cognitive effects.
1.2.3 Active Intermodal Mapping
The Active Intermodal Mapping (AIM) model (e.g. M eltzoff & Moore, 1977, 1983, 
1994, 1997) introduces three theoretical concepts. The first, ‘organ identification’, is 
the process by which infants come to identify parts of their body with parts o f the 
bodies o f others. Meltzoff and Moore argue that this is the first step in the imitative 
process. The second concept ‘organ relations’, refers to the capacity o f the infant to 
parse an observed action into a series of relationships between organs (parts) o f the 
body. The same capacity allows the infant to identify the organ relations o f its own 
body using proprioceptive feedback, and through organ identification, compare organ 
relations o f the model with its own organ relations. Organ relations provide a common
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metric for the percept o f an action to be related to the action o f the perceiver. As 
perception and production are represented using the same coding system, mismatches 
can be detected between the present state o f the observer and the state o f the model. 
The third concept, ‘body babbling’, refers to the process o f learning the relationship 
between muscle movements and the organ relations which result. It is argued that this 
process leads to the formation o f a ‘directory’ o f muscle movements and associated 
organ relations. After such experience-dependent learning, the infant will have the 
ability to produce muscle movements leading to specified organ relations.
These three processes provide the means for an imitative response to be made. 
Observed action is parsed into movements o f the constituent body parts, (organ 
identification), which are represented as relationships between body parts (organ 
relations). Representations gained through action observation are stored and compared 
with the current state o f the observer’s body (through organ identification based on 
proprioceptive feedback and encoded as organ relations) and any mismatch is 
detected. This mismatch becomes the organ relation target. The muscle movements 
needed to achieve this organ relation have been learned through body babbling and 
thus muscle movements can be specified which will reduce the discrepancy between 
the observed organ relations and those of the observer.
The model as it stands has not yet solved the correspondence problem. Although the 
infant can identify the organ relations of its own body, and can identify the organ 
relations o f the model’s body, the two representations are still in incommensurate 
coding systems. Visual organ relations must still be compared to proprioceptive organ 
relations in order for a mismatch to be detected. According to AIM, the problem is
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solved by the use o f a supramodal representational system. This system encodes organ 
relations in a modality-general fashion. Visual and proprioceptive organ relations are 
translated into this common representational framework allowing them to be 
compared directly.
Meltzoff and Moore suggest that AIM explains infant imitation and forms the basis of 
adult imitative competency. The major developmental change in imitation occurs after 
a few weeks o f life when perceived actions are no longer coded as organ relations, but 
rather goal-directed actions (organ relation transformations; M eltzoff & Moore 1997). 
The muscle movements required to perform the act and the supramodal representation 
of the act are integrated to become a single representation.
1.3 Points of theoretical agreement
The theories outlined above agree on two points. First, they all postulate that 
perceptual and motor representations are combined to produce action representations. 
Second, they all predict that it should be possible to learn motor skills through 
observation.
1.3.1 Action representations have both perceptual and motor properties
The three theories all state that imitation relies on the combination o f perceptual and 
motor representations. M eltzoff and Moore’s AIM model argues that supramodal 
representations o f actions, and the muscle movements needed to produce them,
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become integrated into a single representation. Heyes and Ray’s ASL theory suggests 
that perceptual and motor representations become linked by bidirectional excitatory 
associations, and Prinz’s ideomotor theory argues that sensory inputs and motor 
outputs are both coded as perceptual representations o f the effects o f actions. The 
hypothesised combination o f perceptual and motor representations is consistent with 
behavioural evidence that action perception 1) facilitates, and 2) is facilitated by 
action production. It is also supported by neurological evidence that action perception 
and production are associated with common patterns o f 3) cortical, and 4) peripheral 
activation.
Researchers studying the behavioural link between perception and action production 
have concentrated their efforts into the question o f whether perceiving an action 
influences its production. This is the direction o f effect seen in imitation; an action is 
observed and responded to. However, in order to assess the claim that perceptual and 
motor representations become combined, it would be advantageous to demonstrate the 
opposite direction of effect i.e. that action production influences perception. If the 
direction o f influence is only in one direction then two functional representations 
rather than one are implicated, as one representation with two sets o f properties 
should always show co-activation o f those properties.
1.3.1.1 The Influence of Action Perception on Action Production
Typically, studies which have demonstrated an effect o f action perception on action 
production involve actions being performed in response to action stimuli. Participants 
are normally required to perform either a prespecified movement in response to all
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stimuli (simple RT task), or asked to select an appropriate response based on a feature 
o f the stimulus, e.g. colour, which is unrelated to the movement being performed 
(choice RT task). One o f the stimulus actions matches that which the participant must 
use in response (compatible trials) and reaction times to matching stimuli are 
compared with non-matching stimuli (incompatible trials). A reaction time (RT) 
advantage on compatible trials implies that the perception o f the action facilitated its 
performance by the observer.
An example o f such a study is that o f Brass et al. (2001). Participants were asked to 
lift (in one block), or lower (in another block) their index finger as soon as they saw 
movement o f a stimulus hand. Irrespective o f the stimulus movement, participants 
were always required to perform the same movement within a block. Stimulus 
movements were either compatible (matching), or incompatible (non-matching), with 
the response movement. Participants were faster to respond on compatible than 
incompatible trials. In order to discount an explanation o f this effect in terms of 
movement direction alone, the same experiment was performed with the addition of 
stimuli which had been rotated 180°. Movement-type and movement-direction 
compatibility are unconfounded within these stimuli; movement was directed towards 
the bottom of the screen in a finger raise movement, and towards the top o f the screen 
in a finger tap movement. Although compatibility due to movement direction was 
found, this was separate from, and significantly smaller than, compatibility due to 
movement type.
Brass et al (2001) provided evidence that perception could influence action which had 
already been prepared; perception affected when the response was made. Experiments
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performed by the same group (Brass et al., 2000), showed that perception can also 
influence response selection, i.e. which response is made. Participants responded to 
one o f two movement stimuli (raising or lowering o f the index finger) with one o f the 
same two movements. Response selection was not dependent on the observed 
stimulus movement, but on its colour. Colour o f the stimulus movement varied from 
trial to trial, and therefore movement selection could not occur until after the stimulus 
had been processed. Although the movements shown were task irrelevant, responses 
made on compatible trials were faster than those on incompatible trials.
Using a procedure similar to that o f Brass et al (2000), Sturmer, Aschersleben, & 
Prinz (2000) showed that static pictures representing end states of the two stimulus 
movements were as effective as the dynamic gestures in priming the compatible 
response. Similar results have also been reported by Craighero, Bello, Fadiga, & 
Rizzolatti (2002) using clockwise and anticlockwise wrist rotation as stimuli and 
responses, and by Kerzel & Bekkering, (2000) when participants were explicitly 
instructed to ignore the observed movement. In the latter study, the letters “Ba” or 
“Da” were presented to participants. Following the graphemic stimulus, mouth 
movements o f a model articulating the sound “Da ” or “5 a ” were presented. This was 
the cue for participants to articulate the sound previously written on the screen while 
ignoring the mouth movements. Shorter RTs were found when the mouth movements 
and the response were compatible than when they were incompatible. This study, and 
those which have been presented in this section, provide compelling evidence that the 
perception o f action influences action production.
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1.3.1.2 The Influence of Action Production on Perception
If action representations contain perceptual and motor information, one would expect 
action to influence perception. Demonstrations o f action-perception links have been 
provided by Ishimura and Shimojo (1994), Craighero, Fadiga, Rizzolatti, & Umilta 
(1999), and Wohlschlager (2000).
Ishimura and Shimojo (1994) presented bistable apparent motion patterns, which 
could give the impression o f vertical or horizontal motion, to participants while they 
made occluded hand movements. The direction o f the performed hand movements 
strongly affected the judged direction of the apparent motion presented in the visual 
displays. This result was replicated and extended by Wohlschlager (2000) who found 
that in addition to hand movements affecting perceptual judgement o f visual displays, 
judgements were also affected by planned hand movements that were executed after 
the judgement had been made. In an experiment based on similar logic, Craighero, 
Fadiga, Rizzolatti and Umilta (1999) showed that preparing to grasp an object aligned 
with one o f two orientations selectively facilitates perceptual identification o f stimuli 
which correspond to the orientation o f the prepared movement.
The forgoing experiments show immediate effects of action on perception. A series of 
experiments by Hecht, Vogt, & Prinz (2001) provided evidence of longer-term action- 
perception transfer. Participants completed both a motor test (producing timed 
sinusoidal arm movements), and a visual test (making timing judgements of visually 
presented sinusoidal movements), after training on just one of the tests. Test 
performance revealed both action-perception and perception-action transfer. Practice
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of each single test led to better performance than controls (who received no training), 
on both types o f test. Furthermore, no difference was found between motor and visual 
practice on either the motor or visual test.
Knoblich, Seigerschmidt, Flach, & Prinz (2002) argued that self-produced movements 
should be easier to perceive than the movements o f others, due to a better match 
between the perceived movement and the perceiver’s motor plan. This result was 
obtained by Beardsworth & Buckner (1981) who presented subjects with point-light 
displays o f their own walking movements, or those o f their acquaintances. Despite 
greater visual experience o f their acquaintances’ movements compared to their own, 
self-produced movements were more easily recognised.
Studies in Section 1.3.1.1 and 1.3.1.2 provide behavioural support for the combination 
o f perceptual and motor representations. These studies show that perception o f an 
action influences action production, and that action production influences perception. 
The studies in Section 1.3.1.3 and 1.3.1.4 assess whether action perception and 
production produce equivalent patterns o f neural activity. Such equivalence would 
provide support for the argument that neural action representations have both 
perceptual and motor properties.
1.3.1.3 Equivalent Activation of Cortical Areas during Action Perception and
Production
Many electrophysiological and functional imaging studies have shown related 
patterns of motor cortical activation during observation and execution o f actions.
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Areas which show similar patterns of activation include, the supplementary motor 
area (SMA), premotor cortex, primary motor cortex, cerebellum, parietal cortex and 
inferior frontal gyrus. This is true across a variety o f methodologies including, 
functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) (Buccino et al., 2001; Decety et al., 
1997; Manthey, Schubotz, & von Cramon, 2003), Positron Emission Tomography 
(PET) (Chaminade & Decety, 2001; Decety et al., 1997; Decety et al., 1994; Grezes 
& Costes, 1998; Grezes, Costes, & Decety, 1998, 1999; Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Gallese, & 
Fogassi, 1996; Ruby & Decety, 2001; Stevens, Fonlupt, Shiffrar, & Decety, 2000), 
Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) (Aziz-Zadeh, Maeda, Zaidel, Mazziotta, & 
Iacoboni, 2002; Fadiga, Fogassi, Pavesi, & Rizzolatti, 1995), 
Magnetoencephalography (MEG) (Hari et al., 1998; Jarvelainen, Schurmann, 
Avikainen, & Hari, 2001), and Electroencephalography (EEG) (Babiloni et al., 2002; 
Cochin, Barthelemy, Roux, & Martineau, 1999). The equivalence between 
observation and execution holds at both the cortical level (e.g. Buccino et al., 2001; 
Grezes et al., 1998; Manthey et al., 2003), and when excitability is measured in 
peripheral neurons (e.g. Aziz-Zadeh et al., 2002; Fadiga et al., 1995; Strafella & Paus, 
2000).
An experiment which suggests that activity seen in motor areas in response to action 
observation is specific to plausible biological action is that o f Stevens et al (2000). 
Images of action stages were presented at two different speeds. At one speed the 
apparent motion induced by the image change was biologically plausible, and at the 
other speed the motion was biologically implausible. Biologically plausible motion 
produced activation in motor cortical areas but implausible motion did not.
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In addition to demonstration o f motor cortical activation during action observation, 
Iacoboni et al (2001; 1999) showed activation of perceptual areas o f the cortex during 
action production. fMRI was used to identify areas o f the cortex which are active 
during action execution and observation, but are maximally activated during 
situations where observed and executed actions match. One such area was the 
superior temporal sulcus (STS). The STS is a higher-order visual area which responds 
to biological motion (for review see Carey, Perrett, & Oram, 1997), and was found to 
be active during action observation as expected, but was also active during occluded 
hand movements.
1.3.1.4 Specific activation of cortical and peripheral neurons during action
observation
The experiments reported above show general activation o f motor cortical areas in 
response to action observation. Specific activation o f neurons used to produce the 
observed act needs to be shown to provide support for the equivalence o f perceptual 
and motor representations. While evidence for this level o f specificity is not plentiful 
to date, an increasing level o f specificity o f motor activation through observation has 
been shown.
Studies which show specificity o f motor activation using TMS are those o f Aziz- 
Zadeh et al. (2002), Fadiga et al. (1995), Strafella & Paus (2000), and Maeda, 
Kleiner-Fisman, & Pascual-Leone (2002). These utilise a similar experimental logic. 
Participants observe a mixture o f actions and non-actions. The actions observed differ 
in the muscles used to produce them. Motor Evoked Potentials (MEPs) are measured
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from the corresponding muscles in the observer while TMS is applied to motor areas 
o f the cortex. If action observation leads to activation o f the specific areas o f the 
motor cortex which control movements o f the muscle being observed, then MEPs 
should be 1) greater for action observation than non-action observation, and 2) 
specific to the action being observed i.e. MEPs should only be greater during action 
observation for those muscles which would be recruited in performing the observed 
movement.
In their work o f this kind, Aziz-Zadeh et al (2002) demonstrated a laterality effect. 
Larger MEPs were observed in the right hand when right rather than left hand actions 
were observed, while left hand MEPs only increased during observation o f left hand 
movements. Greater specificity was shown by Fadiga et al (1995) and Strafella and 
Paus (2000). In both o f these experiments, actions involving the right hand or the right 
arm were observed. When MEPs from arm and hand muscles were recorded, an 
increase in muscle excitability was found only upon observation o f the action which 
required activity in that muscle. A recent study by Maeda et al (2002) indicated yet 
greater specificity. Participants watched one o f three finger movements o f the right 
hand, all performed by different muscles. MEPs recorded from the corresponding 
muscles in the participant’s own right hand were only higher when they observed a 
movement o f that particular muscle.
Turning from peripheral to cortical activation, Buccino et al. (2001) used fMRI to 
measure activation caused by observing actions involving either the mouth, arm/hand, 
or foot. Activation caused by observation of the movements was centred on the part of 
the premotor cortex that is active when a person performs that movement.
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Although action observation leads to the activation o f motor cortical areas that would 
be used to perform the observed action, humans do not compulsively imitate. A 
potential mechanism for imitation inhibition has been described by Baldissera, 
Cavallari, Craighero, & Fadiga (2001). Spinal cord excitability was measured by 
eliciting the H-reflex in a finger flexor muscle while participants watched a hand 
opening or closing. The recorded H-reflex size varied according to the action 
observed in the opposite manner to that which occurs during execution o f the 
movements. Baldissera et al posit that the inverted activation with respect to action 
execution seen at the spinal level may act to inhibit imitation.
1.3.2 Observational Learning of Motor Skills
In addition to implying a close relationship between action perception and production, 
all three theories o f imitation predict learning o f motor skills through observation. The 
ASL model o f Heyes and Ray explicitly includes the learning o f new motor skills 
through observation as a consequence of the imitation system. It is argued that novel 
skills can be decomposed into a sequence o f motor primitives which are arranged in a 
novel combination or order. As long as these motor primitives have been previously 
learned by the observer (or have been specified innately), and vertical links between 
motor primitives and their perceptual representations have been formed through 
experience, novel actions can be learned through observation.
The AIM model o f M eltzoff and Moore also includes the capability to learn motor 
skills through observation. M eltzoff and Moore specify an innate cognitive module
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which transforms perceptual representations into supramodal representations which 
are used to produce actions. It is argued that the development o f this module is not 
experience-dependent (e.g. M eltzoff and Moore 1997) and that imitation to some 
degree o f fidelity can be accomplished on the first occasion that an act is perceived.
Ideomotor Theory claims that the common coding o f perception and action enables 
observed actions to activate the action representation with which they share the most 
ideomotor similarity. If novel actions are composed o f movement primitives, then 
observation of each primitive would activate the action representation with which it 
shares the greatest degree o f ideomotor similarity and the novel sequence would be 
imitated.
Many studies provide evidence o f skill learning by observation (see Weeks & 
Anderson, 2000, for details), and much of this literature has arisen from sports 
science. An example which claims to show facilitation o f motor skill learning through 
observation is that conducted by Whiting, Bijlard, & Denbrinker (1987). Practice o f a 
complex series o f movements on a ski simulator was completed with or without 
simultaneous observation o f an expert model. Practice supplemented by observation 
produced movements which were more fluent, and had a more consistent tempo, than 
practice alone. A problem with the claim that motor learning has taken place through 
observation is that participants observed the movement o f the ski simulator as well as 
the model. It is possible that a perceptual representation o f the ski simulator’s 
movements, not o f the model’s actions, was used to guide performance.
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Learning is less ambiguous in a study by Ishikura & Inomata (1995). Participants 
watched a model perform a sequence of balletic poses and reproduced these actions 
on test. As body movements were the only stimuli observed, the motor sequence was 
learned through observation of biological movement i.e. through imitation. This 
experiment provides good evidence that motor information can be learned through 
observation, a conclusion which is supported by the results of later experiments 
(Vinter & Perruchet, 2002; Weeks & Anderson, 2000).
A procedure which is ideally suited to discovering any observational learning of 
motor skills is the Serial Reaction Time (SRT) task (Nissen & Bullemer, 1987). The 
following section will present two studies which have investigated whether 
observation can support learning o f motor skills, and have reached rather different 
conclusions (Kelly and Burton 2001, Heyes and Foster 2002).
Participants in an SRT task press an appropriate key in response to a stimulus 
appearing at one o f a number o f locations and their RT is measured. Stimulus location 
follows a repeating sequence over training trials but follows a different sequence or 
random order during test trials. An RT increase on test trials implies that the training 
sequence has been learned. This task can be easily adapted to investigate learning 
through observation by requiring participants to observe a model performing the task 
during training trials.
Kelly and Burton (2001, Experiment 1) compared the performance o f practice 
participants (who respond during training), and observers (who watch practice 
participants during training) on an SRT task using a 12-item ambiguous sequence,
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with 4 stimulus locations and four response alternatives. Each stimulus location is 
followed by more than one other in an ambiguous sequence, in contrast to unique 
sequences where the next stimulus can always be predicted by the current. No 
evidence o f any sequence learning was found in observers when compared to practice 
participants.
In contrast, Heyes and Foster (2002) found evidence o f observational learning using a 
6-item unique sequence with six stimulus and response locations. The contrast 
between the results o f Kelly and Burton (2001) and Heyes and Foster (2002) could be 
due to a number o f factors. The most obvious difference between the experiments is 
the group used for comparison with the observers. Kelly and Burton (2001) compared 
sequence knowledge gained through observation to that gained through practice, 
whereas Heyes and Foster compared sequence knowledge o f observers and practice 
participants to that o f untrained controls (Dienes & Altmann, 2003; Perruchet & 
Reber, 2003). Thus Kelly and Burton cannot claim that observers did not learn 
through observation, rather that observers did not learn as much as those who 
practiced the task. A further difference between the studies is the competence o f the 
model. Heyes and Foster used a highly practiced model who made very few errors. 
Kelly and Burton used a practice participant as the model; presumably this model 
produced more errors, slower response times and less fluid movements. Another 
major difference between the experiments is the sequence used. Kelly and Burton 
used a longer, more complex sequence than Heyes and Foster. It may be that only 
short simple sequences can be learned through observation. Thus, although Kelly and 
Burton (2001) did not find any evidence o f observational learning, this evidence is not 
secure as it conflicts with the majority of findings in this area.
25
This section has presented empirical work demonstrating that information can be 
acquired through observation which aids motor performance. These experiments, in 
contrast to those presented in Section 1.4.1, do not elucidate the nature o f the learning 
which takes place through observation. It will be argued below (sections 1.4.1 and 
1.4.2), that the nature o f the representations gained through observation is of 
theoretical importance for imitation research.
1.4 Theoretical Differences
This section discusses three issues which differentiate the theories o f imitation 
described in Section 1.2, and evaluates existing empirical evidence relating to these 
issues. The three differences to be discussed are: the effector-dependence o f motor 
representations formed through observation (Section 1.4.1), awareness o f 
representations formed through observation (Section 1.4.2), and the origins of 
imitative competence (Section 1.4.3). These differences form the basis for the 
experiments reported in this thesis.
4.1 Effector-Dependence of Motor Representations Gained By Observation
Learning is said to be effector-dependent to the extent that training o f one set of 
muscles (e.g. those o f the right hand) does not generalize to another (e.g. those o f the 
left hand). Effector-dependence o f practice-based learning has been demonstrated in 
both monkeys (Rand, Hikosaka, Miyachi, Lu, & Miyashita, 1998) and humans (Bapi, 
Doya, & Hamer, 2000; Marcovitch & Flanagan, in press). For example, Marcovitch
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and Flanagan allowed human participants to learn a sequence o f movements to spatial 
targets with one hand, and then tested performance o f the other hand on the training 
sequence or a novel sequence. Performance o f the training sequence was no better 
than that o f a novel sequence, implying that sequence learning in the training phase 
had been effector-dependent.
The effector-dependence o f motor representations formed through observation divides 
the three theories of imitation into two camps. AIM and Ideomotor theories both 
predict that representations gained through observation would not be effector- 
dependent, while the ASL model o f imitation suggests that such representations may 
be formed through observation.
The ASL model o f imitation predicts that under some circumstances, effector- 
dependent representations will be formed by action observation. These representations 
are formed when visual information activates motor representations directly, without 
intermediate symbolic or other higher-order representation. Thus, motor information 
can be learned without, for example, accompanying verbal script or perceptual 
representations. These observation-activated motor representations will be effector- 
dependent to the extent that prior visual experience o f each movement component has 
been paired with activation o f a distinct and constant muscle set. This condition is 
likely to be met for movements which provide visual feedback when they are 
executed, such as finger movements. When a person looks at their hands during 
manual movements, the sight of, for example, the left index finger lifting will be 
paired more reliably with activation o f muscles in the left index finger than with 
activation of muscles in the left ring finger or the right index finger.
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The AIM model o f imitation would not predict that representations formed through 
observation would be effector-dependent. Although representations and information 
processing stages are underspecified by the AIM model, it is claimed that perceptual 
representations are transformed into ‘supramodal’ representations. Meltzoff and 
Moore (e.g. 1997) claim that supramodal representations can be translated into a 
variety o f motor outputs, a feature incompatible with effector-dependence.
Ideomotor theory would also not predict effector-dependent representations, due to 
the many sources o f ideomotor similarity between the perception o f a movement and 
internal action representations. Movement percepts can bear ideomotor similarity to 
an action representation on spatial, visual, or even higher-level cognitive features.
This feature o f ideomotor action representations means that a perceived movement 
would activate a number o f different action representations, any one o f which could 
produce a ‘matching’ movement based on spatial, visual, or higher-order criteria.
For effector-dependent learning to be demonstrated through observation, motor 
representations, specific to the effector used by the model, must be formed. This was 
not demonstrated in the experiments presented in section 1.3.2, which indicated that 
information can be learned through observation which can aid motor performance, but 
did not demonstrate how it was encoded. Rather than motor representations, observers 
may form a perceptual representation (‘mental movie’) o f the model’s movements. 
Alternatively the movements o f the model may be encoded in a symbolic or linguistic 
fashion. Empirical studies investigating the nature o f representations formed through
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observation o f action are not plentiful; however those studies which have investigated 
this issue are presented here.
An experiment using an instructed imitation procedure, (“Do what I do”), which 
suggests that motor representations are not used in response production after 
movement observation, is that o f Bekkering, Wohlschlager, and Gattis (2000). Young 
children (mean 4.4 years) imitated reaching movements to one of two targets which 
followed either an ipsilateral or contralateral path. While children usually reached for 
the correct target, they commonly used the ipsilateral hand when a contralateral 
movement had been demonstrated.
Bekkering et al argued that these data show that young children focus on the goal of 
the movement and perform the most familiar motor program associated with it, rather 
than acquiring and implementing the observed motor program. This explanation was 
supported by the finding that when the goal component was removed (by making 
movements to one target rather than two), children successfully imitated the 
movement path. If  this explanation is correct, effector-dependent motor learning was 
not shown, as action goals rather than movements were learned through observation. 
However, it is possible that effector-dependent motor representations may have been 
formed in Bekkering et al’s study, but task variables caused response to be based on 
different action representations.
The only study to report effector-dependent learning by observation is that of Heyes 
and Foster (2002). Observers watched an expert model train on the SRT task. On test, 
observers demonstrated their sequence knowledge using the effectors they had
29
observed during training, but could not do so using different effectors. Thus Heyes 
and Foster claim to have shown the formation o f effector-dependent motor 
representations through observation. This result is flawed however, as observers were 
given a chance to physically practice the training sequence prior to testing, and thus 
their sequence knowledge may have been acquired through practice and not 
observation.
The issue o f whether effector-dependent motor representations are formed through 
observation is o f great theoretical importance, yet is under-investigated in the 
literature on imitation. Chapters 2 and 3 o f this thesis investigate whether observers 
can learn a sequence through observation of a model’s response using the SRT task, 
and more importantly, whether the knowledge they gain is effector-dependent 
(Chapter 2). If effector-dependent representations are demonstrated as a result of 
observational learning, doubt will be cast upon the processes o f imitation specified by 
the AIM, and Ideomotor theories o f imitation. Such a demonstration would however 
provide support for the ASL model of imitation which predicts that under appropriate 
conditions, (such as when movements are open to visual self-monitoring), effector- 
dependent representations will be formed by action observation.
1.4.2 The Role of Awareness in Imitation
Another major issue dividing the theories concerns the level o f conscious awareness 
which accompanies imitation. This issue divides the AIM model from the ASL and 
Ideomotor theories o f imitation. While ASL and Ideomotor theories suggest that 
under some circumstances imitation may occur automatically, without conscious
30
awareness (Heyes, in press; Prinz, in press), the AIM model posits that imitation is an 
active, effortful process, which is based on conscious representation (Meltzoff and 
Moore 1997). While the ASL and Ideomotor theories do not rule out the possibility 
that in some cases imitation is based on conscious processes, the AIM model o f 
imitation cannot explain imitation which is automatic in nature, stressing as it does the 
role of effortful, goal-directed processing.
Consistent with AIM, previous research has generally concluded that observational 
sequence learning is only possible when participants have explicit knowledge o f the 
sequence (e.g. Kelly, Burton, Riedel and Lynch 2003, Kelly and Burton 2001, 
Willingham 1999, Berry 1991), and is therefore fundamentally different from the 
implicit learning (“learning which proceeds without concurrent awareness o f what is 
being learned.” Shanks & St-John, 1994), shown by practice participants in the SRT 
task (e.g. Seger, 1997; Willingham et al., 1989).
Kelly and Burton (2001) have argued that observational sequence learning is only 
possible when sequence knowledge is explicit. This hypothesis was supported by 
Kelly, Burton, Riedel and Lynch (2003) who compared observers o f screen stimuli 
(but not o f a model’s responses), with practice participants on the SRT task. In an 
attempt to manipulate the amount o f explicit sequence knowledge, half o f the 
participants in each group were shown the sequence as normal, and the other half 
were shown the sequence broken up into triplets through the use o f colour (salient 
condition). The use o f colour increased the amount o f explicit knowledge gained by 
participants. Both practice groups, but only the salient observer group, showed 
significant sequence learning upon test. This provides support for the hypothesis that
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practice participants, but not observers, are able to learn without explicit knowledge 
o f the sequence.
The results o f several studies are consistent with Kelly and Burton’s hypothesis, as 
they show the importance o f explicit knowledge for observational sequence learning. 
Howard, Mutter, & Howard (1992) compared a screen-stimuli observation group and 
a practice group on the SRT task and a free generation task. During a free generation 
task participants are asked to generate the sequence upon which they have been 
trained in the absence o f any cuing stimuli. Observers showed as much knowledge as 
practice participants on the SRT task and their knowledge was explicit as indicated by 
successful generation o f the training sequence. Willingham (1999b) replicated this 
result and found that observational learning was only shown by those participants 
with high levels o f explicit knowledge.
In contrast to the above findings, Seger (1997) found that ratings o f familiarity and 
SRT performance were uncorrelated for screen-stimulus observers classified as 
having low explicit knowledge from a verbal report style questionnaire, i.e. 
participants were unaware of their sequence knowledge. Thus, Seger (1997) has 
shown implicit observational learning, at least on a subset o f participants who had 
previously been classified as having low explicit knowledge. Seger’s evidence is 
questionable however, as it is in opposition to results obtained from many 
experiments which suggest that observational learning relies on explicit knowledge 
(e.g. Kelly et al 2003, Willingham 1999, Howard, Mutter and Howard 1992). It 
should be noted that observers in these experiments watched screen stimuli only. This
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can be contrasted with the SRT experiments presented in Section 1.3.2, in which 
observers watched a model’s responses in addition to screen stimuli.
Turning from observational learning to imitation o f behaviour, several studies suggest 
that social interaction may produce imitation which is unconscious and unintentional 
(e.g. Chartrand and Bargh, 1999; and Lakin and Chartrand, 2003). Participants in 
these studies are generally asked to freely interact with another individual whom they 
believe is a participant, but who is actually a confederate o f the researchers. The 
confederate exhibits a target behaviour during the interaction (such as tapping their 
foot), and the tendency o f the participant to perform the target behaviour during the 
interaction is compared to a baseline period when the participant is alone. Results 
consistently show an increase in performance o f the target behaviour by the 
participant during the interaction. Also, during post-test debriefing, participants report 
that they did not notice the target behaviour being demonstrated, that they had no 
intention to imitate the behaviour, and that they were unaware o f doing so. Thus, if  
one accepts the finding o f these studies, it has been demonstrated that imitation can 
occur automatically, without conscious awareness or effort.
Such a conclusion would not be consistent with the characterisation o f imitation 
suggested by AIM. However, the use of verbal report measures as tests o f awareness 
has been criticised by Shanks and St John (1994). They argue that three features o f a 
verbal report measure make it unsuitable for testing awareness. The first is the 
assumption that knowledge demonstrated at the time o f verbal report is an accurate 
reflection o f knowledge at the time o f testing. It is possible that participants may 
forget information in the interval between the test o f performance and their verbal
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report. The second refers to a potential mismatch between the information upon which 
performance is based, and information asked for by the experimenter or which is able 
to be expressed verbally by the participant (‘Information Criterion’). The third feature 
o f a verbal report measure which makes it unsatisfactory as a measure o f awareness is 
that it is likely that the verbal report measure and the test o f production are 
differentially sensitive to conscious knowledge (‘Sensitivity Criterion’).
The AIM model suggests that imitation occurs only as a product o f effortful goal- 
directed processing. In support o f this position, several researchers argue that 
observational learning is only possible when information is explicitly represented. In 
contrast, both the ASL and Ideomotor theories o f imitation suggest that automatic 
imitation, which does not need to be driven by conscious representations, can occur. 
Research using an insufficiently rigorous test o f awareness suggests, but does not 
provide firm evidence, that unconscious unintentional imitation may be possible. The 
experiments reported in Chapter 2 o f this thesis (experiments 4-6) investigated how 
aware participants are o f information gained through observation o f a model’s 
responses and/or screen stimuli in an SRT task. Evidence o f implicit observational 
learning would support the ASL and Ideomotor theories but not the AIM model of 
imitation.
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1.4.3 The Role of Experience in Imitation
Whether the ability to imitate arises from experience, or is present from birth, has 
direct relevance to theories o f imitation. The two views can be mapped directly onto 
the ASL and Ideomotor theories, and the AIM model, respectively. The ASL model 
posits that imitative ability arises from contiguous experience o f perceiving and 
producing action. Such experience causes vertical links to be formed between 
perceptual and motor representations which enable an imitative movement to be 
made. Thus, the range o f movements that can be imitated by an individual is limited 
by the extent to which vertical links have been formed between perceptual and motor 
representations. Similarly, Ideomotor Theory holds that for an action to be imitated, 
the perceptual effects of producing the movement must be learned through 
experience. The perceptual effects o f producing the movement become the action 
representation which is then used to imitate. Both ASL and Ideomotor Theory suggest 
imitative competence is a function of the individual’s experience o f action perception 
and production.
Conversely, the AIM model argues that imitation is achieved through a dedicated, 
innate, cognitive module. This module transforms perceptual representations o f action 
into supramodal representations which are used to produce matching motor output. 
The principal evidence in support o f this view comes from studies o f facial gesture 
imitation in newborn infants (‘neonates’). A wide range o f laboratories claim to have 
demonstrated neonatal imitation (e.g. Field, Goldstein, Vaga-Lahr, & Porter, 1986; 
Field et al., 1983; M eltzoff & Moore, 1977,1983, 1994), while several studies 
suggest that the evidence for neonatal imitation is flawed, inconclusive, or limited to
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one gesture only (e.g. Anisfeld 1991, 1996, 2001, in press, Couturier-Fagan 1996). 
Such a limitation would suggest that infants do not imitate actions; rather that tongue 
protrusion may act as ‘an innate releasing mechanism’ (Heimann & Ullstadius, 1999), 
or that tongue protrusion may be an arousal response (Jones, 1996, in press).
Although such widely different views are held, there is little direct discourse between 
proponents o f the opposite views (Heimann, 2002; Nadel & Butterworth, 1999), and 
therefore it is not possible to form a firm conclusion as to the existence and/or extent 
o f neonatal imitation.
Although the results o f neonatal research are equivocal, two recent studies with adult 
participants provided some evidence that experience plays a role in imitation (Howard 
et al., 2001; Maeda et al., 2002). Howard et al (2001) used fMRI to investigate 
neurological activation in the motor cortices of musicians and non-musicians upon 
observation o f musically significant and non-significant movements. Greater activity 
was observed in musicians in response to observation o f both types o f movement.
This may have been due to musicians’ greater experience o f performing imitative 
movements during musical training. More direct evidence o f the importance of 
experience in imitation was provided by Maeda et al (2002). MEPs induced by TMS 
were recorded from thumb and finger muscles during observation o f thumb and finger 
movements. As expected (see Section 1.3.1 above), MEPs were significantly larger 
from rest in each o f the muscles only when movements were observed which involved 
the corresponding muscle. Additionally, movements were observed either in a 
familiar plane or rotated so as to appear unfamiliar. MEPs were significantly greater 
when movements were observed from the familiar angle, suggesting that the
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activation produced during observation depended on the observer’s experience o f the 
movement.
Turning from empirical data to artificial simulations o f imitation, the studies of 
Alissandrakis et al. (2002), and Hoppitt & Laland (2002) lend support to the 
possibility o f imitation through associative learning. Hoppitt and Laland (2002) used 
neural network modelling to show that associative mechanisms o f the type proposed 
by ASL could be used to imitate both perceptually transparent and perceptually 
opaque actions. Furthermore, associative links could be formed between perceptual 
and motor representations even when large amounts o f behavioural “noise” were 
introduced into the model’s learning environment. The behavioural noise is said to 
mimic situations where an action is performed while a non-matching action is 
perceived. Another study which suggests that imitation based on associative learning 
is possible in principle is that o f Alissandrakis et al (2002). This study showed that 
imitation o f actions between dissimilarly embodied software agents was possible 
using a system based on the ASL architecture.
Thus, a small number o f experiments suggest that experience may play a role in the 
emergence o f imitative ability, but the evidence is very limited. The studies of 
Alissandrakis et al (2002) and Hoppitt and Laland (2002) both report non-human data, 
while the study o f Howard et al (2001) did not involve an imitation task, only action 
observation.
The experiments reported in Chapter 4 investigated the effect o f counter-imitative 
training on the priming o f a compatible response during action observation.
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Experiment 7 demonstrated action priming by movement observation. Experiment 8 
investigated how experience o f performing an opposite movement to that observed 
(counter-imitative training), affected subsequent movement priming by action 
observation. If imitation is the result o f an innate module, one would expect such 
training to have little impact on action priming. Conversely, if  imitation is a result o f 
experience, counter-imitative training should negate, or even reverse, the priming o f a 
corresponding response.
1.5 Summary
Three theories o f imitation have been outlined: the Associative Sequence Learning 
model (Heyes & Ray, 2000), Ideomotor Theory (e.g. Prinz 2002,1997), and the 
Active Intermodal Mapping model (Meltzoff and Moore e.g. 1977, 1997). Evidence 
demonstrating the interaction between the perception and production o f action, and 
observational learning o f motor skills is consistent with all three theories. The theories 
make differential predictions regarding the possibility o f 1) effector-dependent, and 2) 
implicit learning by action observation, and 3) the role o f experience in the 
development of the capacity to imitate. These three issues are addressed by the 
experiments reported in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 respectively.
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Chapter 2: Effector-Dependent Learning by Observation
Effector-dependent learning is said to have occurred when motor information learned 
by use or observation o f one effector cannot be expressed by another. For example, 
knowledge required to produce a signature would be effector-dependent i f  an 
individual could sign their name with one hand, but not the other. Practice-based 
effector-dependent learning has been demonstrated in both monkeys (Rand, Hikosaka, 
Miyachi, Lu, & Miyashita, 1998) and humans (Bapi, Doya, & Hamer, 2000;
Marcovitch & Flanagan, in press).
Whether effector-dependent learning can occur by observation is an issue upon which 
the three theories o f imitation can be differentiated. Both AIM and Ideomotor theories 
o f imitation suggest that this type o f learning should not be possible, while the ASL 
theory predicts that, under some circumstances, effector-dependent learning can occur 
by observation. The AIM model suggests that perceptual representations o f 
movements are transformed into flexible, ‘amodal’ representations which can be 
translated into several different motor representations, enabling the perceived action 
to be performed in a variety o f ways using a range o f effectors. Ideomotor theory also 
suggests that perceived actions can lead to a variety o f motor representations 
becoming activated. Each perceptual representation activates a number o f action 
representations based on many levels of similarity between the perceived action and 
the stored action representation. Higher-order, cognitive, matching o f movement goals 
leads to flexibility in what is matched, and the effector used to perform the matching 
movement.
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Thus, both theories postulate that information derived from model observation is 
always subject to flexible, higher-order encoding, and therefore would not predict the 
kind o f constraint on expression of that knowledge represented by effector- 
dependence. In contrast, ASL theory suggests that visual information from the model 
can activate motor representations directly, without intermediate symbolic or other 
higher-order representation. These observation-activated motor representations will be 
effector-dependent to the extent that prior visual experience o f each movement 
component has been paired with activation o f a distinct and constant muscle set. Thus, 
ASL theory predicts that, under conditions in which practice-based learning is 
effector-dependent, observational learning will also be effector-dependent.
Until recently, the idea that task observation, rather than practice, could engage 
effector-dependent processes o f motor learning was so implausible that observation 
was often used as a control for this kind of learning (Stadler, 1989; Willingham,
1999). However, recent research on the human 'mirror system' (Buccino et al., 2001; 
Rizzolatti, Fogassi, & Gallese, 2001) and, more specifically, electrophysiological 
evidence o f motor facilitation during action observation, has made the idea of 
effector-dependent learning by observation more plausible (Aziz-Zadeh, Maeda, 
Zaidel, Mazziotta, & Iacoboni, 2002; Maeda, Kleiner-Fisman, & Pascual-Leone,
2002; Strafella & Paus, 2000). In these studies, participants observed body 
movements while MEPs invoked by TMS were recorded from a range o f effector 
muscles. MEPs recorded from muscles involved in production o f the observed 
movement were greater during movement observation than rest. For example, during 
thumb movement observation, MEP size was greater for the abductor pollicis brevis 
(APB), which is involved in executing thumb movements, than for the first dorsal
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interosseus (FDI), which is active during finger movements, and this relationship 
between APB and FDI activation was reversed when participants observed finger 
movements (Maeda et al., 2002).
These electrophysiological data suggest that movement observation can activate 
effector-dependent motor representations stored in the primary motor cortex (Aziz- 
Zadeh et al., 2002). As this is likely to be necessary for effector-dependent learning 
by observation, these data are consistent with the hypothesis that such learning occurs. 
However, learning does not only involve activation o f existing motor representations: 
formation o f new connections between existing motor representations is also 
necessary. Therefore these electrophysiological data are insufficient in determining 
whether new sequences can be learned in an effector-dependent fashion by 
observation.
To investigate effector-dependence of observational learning, the present study used 
an SRT task. In a typical version o f this task, a stimulus appears in one o f several 
locations on each trial, and the participant presses a key corresponding to that 
location. The stimulus follows a predictable repeating sequence and, after many 
cycles, participants provide evidence of sequence knowledge by responding more 
slowly when the sequence is changed than when stimuli were presented in the training 
sequence. The SRT task is an ideal tool to study effector-dependence o f observation 
learning for several reasons. First, it can be readily adapted to investigate 
observational learning by requiring participants to watch a model performing the task 
during the training phase, before completing tests in which they press the keys 
themselves. Second, SRT tasks assess sequence learning, the kind o f learning that
41
distinguishes activation o f pre-existing motor representations from acquisition of 
’new' motor representations. Finally, there is evidence that motor learning is involved 
when participants perform the task themselves (Mayr, 1996; Willingham, 1999; 
Willingham, Nissen, & Bullemer, 1989). For example, Willingham (1999,
Experiment 3) added to the SRT task a transfer test in which the stimulus-response 
mapping was changed so that, relative to training, one group o f participants pressed 
the same sequence o f keys but saw new stimuli, whereas another group pressed a 
different sequence o f keys but saw the same stimuli. Transfer to the new mapping 
occurred only if  the motor sequence was kept constant.
Kelly and Burton (2001) failed to find evidence o f observational learning o f any kind 
(perceptual or motoric) when they compared the SRT performance o f practice 
participants with that o f observers who watched a practice participant during training 
on a 12-item ambiguous sequence. However, Heyes and Foster (2002) reported 
evidence o f observational learning when they compared participants who had 
observed an expert responding to a six-item unique sequence with controls who had 
performed an unrelated anagram task during training. Therefore, in the present study, 
to ensure that observational learning would be detected, the same six-item sequence 
and kind o f comparison group was used as in Heyes & Foster (2002).
Many studies have reported implicit learning o f 10- or 12-item ambiguous sequences 
in the SRT task, i.e. sequence knowledge that is not accessible to conscious awareness 
(e.g. Seger, 1997; Willingham, 1999). A six-item unique sequence, o f the kind used in 
the present study, is very simple compared with the sequences used in this previous 
work, and therefore is unlikely to be learned implicitly. However, it would be
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interesting if observational learning o f a six-item unique sequence could be shown to 
be both effector-dependent and explicit, because such evidence would be 
incompatible with a recent model of motor skill learning (Hikosaka, Nakamura, Sakai, 
& Nakahara, 2002). This model proposes that effector-dependent learning is typically 
implicit, whereas effector-independent learning is typically explicit. Therefore, in 
addition to asking whether participants' knowledge was effector-dependent, it was 
investigated whether knowledge was implicit or explicit using free generation 
(Experiment 1) and recognition (Experiment 2) tests (Shanks & Johnstone, 1999).
In a standard SRT task, practice-based learning is demonstrated by comparing RTs to 
stimuli presented in the training sequence and in an alternative sequence. However, in 
the present study observers are compared with controls who were not exposed to a 
sequence during training. In this case observational learning is indicated when the 
increase in RT upon transfer to the new sequence is greater for observers than 
controls. Thus, the control group provides a baseline, and if  the introduction o f a new 
sequence delays responding more in the observers than in the controls, there is 
evidence that the former group learned the sequence by observation. This logic 
applies to both o f the control groups used in the present study. In Experiment 1, 
control participants were untrained (Dienes & Altmann, 2003; Perruchet & Reber, 
2003), they performed an unrelated anagram task during the training phase, and in 
Experiments 2 and 3 controls observed a model performing the SRT task when order 
o f target presentation was randomly determined.
To find out whether observational learning had been effector-dependent, participants 
in all experiments were given two transfer tests following the initial test o f sequence
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knowledge. In Experiments 1 and 2, each transfer test consisted o f a block o f trials in 
which stimulus presentation was determined by the training sequence, followed by a 
block in which it was determined by the new sequence. In one o f these tests, the 
'stimulus transfer test', the stimuli appeared in a vertical rather than a horizontal array 
of boxes on the screen, and responses were made, as during training, with the fingers. 
In the other, 'response transfer test', the stimuli appeared in a horizontal array, as they 
had during training, but participants were required to respond using their thumbs 
rather than their fingers. If  RT increase upon transfer to the new sequence is greater 
for observers than controls on the stimulus transfer test only, then effector-dependent 
learning will be suggested. Observers would be able to use their sequence knowledge 
when the stimuli were presented in a different spatial array, but not when responding 
with different effectors (Stadler, 1989).
2.1 Experiment 1
The first experiment involved two groups o f participants, which received different 
treatment in the training phase: Group Observe Sequence watched the experimenter's 
fingers as he performed the SRT task, whereas Group Control completed an unrelated 
anagram task. After initial testing for sequence knowledge, they were given transfer 
tests in which all participants responded to the training sequence and then to a new 
sequence under two conditions: when the stimulus array was unchanged but they were 
required to use their thumbs rather than their fingers to respond (response transfer 
test), and when responses were made with the fingers, but the stimuli appeared in a 
vertical rather than a horizontal array (stimulus transfer test).
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If, in both transfer tests, transition to the new sequence is associated with a greater 
increase in RT in Group Observe Sequence than in Group Control, it would imply that 
sequence knowledge learned by observation can withstand alterations o f both stimulus 
array and response effector. This would suggest that the observers' sequence 
knowledge is encoded in an effector-independent, symbolic fashion (e.g. linguistically 
or numerically). Alternatively, if  observers’ performance does not differ from that o f 
controls when both groups respond to a vertical rather than a horizontal stimulus 
array, but does when responses are made with the thumbs, learning o f stimulus 
locations is implied. This is unlikely given that the observers in Experiment 1 could 
not see the stimuli on the screen during training. Effector-dependent learning o f a 
finger movement sequence by observation would be implicated if  the performance of 
observers and controls was only different on the stimulus transfer test. In this case 
transition to the new sequence would cause greater RT elevation in observers than in 
controls when responses are made to a vertical rather than a horizontal stimulus array, 
but not when responses are made with thumbs rather than fingers. This outcome 
would implicate effector-dependent learning by observation by showing that, relative 
to that o f controls, the observers' sequence knowledge transfers across alterations in 
the stimulus array, but not to a situation where different effectors are used to perform 
the task.
2.1.1 Method
Participants. Twenty-four students at University College London (UCL) participated 
in the experiment, 12 in each o f Groups Observe Sequence and Control. Their mean 
age was 23.6 years, eight were male, and each was paid a small honorarium for their
participation. As is usual in SRT experiments (see e.g. Curran & Keele, 1993; Seger, 
1997), participants (n=5) who made more than 10% errors during the random and 
initial test blocks were replaced.
Stimuli & Apparatus. Stimulus presentation, RT measurement, and response 
recording were all implemented on IBM-compatible PCs with 43 cm colour monitors 
and standard QWERTY keyboards. Six boxes were presented in a horizontal row in 
the centre o f the screen, drawn with black lines against a grey background. The boxes 
were 2.2 cm wide and 1.2 cm high, spaced 1-cm apart, and viewed at a distance o f 
approximately 60 cm. A white asterisk (Arial font size 36, subtending approximately 
0.5° o f visual angle) appeared in the centre o f one o f these boxes on each target 
location trial. Target locations are referred to as 1-6 from left to right. Participants 
were instructed to indicate locations 1 - 6 as quickly as possible by using the X, C, V, 
B, N, and M keys located across the bottom of the keyboard, respectively. They 
operated the X, C, and V keys with the ring, middle, and index fingers o f their left 
hand, and the B, N, and M keys with the index, middle and ring fingers o f their right 
hand, respectively.
Each block consisted o f 100 target location trials. Incorrect responses were signalled 
by a tone. A trial ended when a participant pressed the correct key, at which time the 
target was erased. The next trial began 200 ms later. RT was measured from target 
onset until a correct response had been made.
Procedure. Participants were told that they were taking part in a choice RT task 
designed to measure their speed o f response. For all participants, the experiment had 5
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phases: 1) familiarization, 2) training, 3) initial testing, 4) transfer, and 5) free 
generation. The two groups received identical treatment in all phases except the 
training phase. During training, Group Observe Sequence watched the experimenter's 
fingers as he performed the SRT task, and Group Control completed anagram 
problems for a comparable period of time.
Familiarization. In the familiarization phase, participants were given one block of 
target location trials in which the order o f target presentation was randomly 
determined.
Training. Group Observe Sequence were instructed to watch the experimenter's 
fingers as he completed six blocks o f target location trials, in which the sequence of 
targets was 2-5-1-4-6-3. Each block o f 100 trials included 16 repetitions o f the whole 
training sequence, and began at a random point in that sequence. Observers were 
seated to the right, and just behind the experimenter, on a chair which had been raised 
to give them a slightly elevated view o f his fingers on the keyboard. The screen was 
turned away from the observers so that they could not see the target stimuli to which 
the experimenter was responding. Before the first training block participants were 
told, “Please pay close attention to the experimenter’s hands as he completes the task. 
It has been shown that the more closely you attend to the hands, the better you will do 
in the later stages o f the experiment”. The experimenter provided a model o f expert 
performance, with a mean RT ranging from 273 ms (SE = 7) to 299 ms (SE = 9) 
across the 6 blocks. Error rate varied from 0 to 2 %. For the duration o f the training 
period (8 minutes), participants in Group Control solved anagram problems.
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Initial testing. The initial test o f sequence learning consisted of three blocks o f target 
location trials, completed by all participants. In the first and last of these blocks, 
targets were presented in the training sequence, i.e. 2-5-1-4-6-3. In the second block, 
they were presented in a new, six-item unique sequence: 4-2-6-3-1-5.
Transfer. The order o f the stimulus transfer and the response transfer tests was 
counterbalanced, with half o f the participants in each group completing the stimulus 
transfer test first. Each transfer test consisted of two blocks o f trials. In the first, 
targets were presented in the training sequence, and in the second they were presented 
in the new sequence. In the stimulus transfer test, the stimulus boxes were arranged in 
a vertical, rather than a horizontal, line in the centre o f the computer screen. As during 
training, participants were required to respond to targets 1-6 (now running from the 
top to the bottom of the screen) using the ring, middle and index fingers o f each hand, 
applied to keys X, C, V, B, N and M. In the response transfer test, the stimulus boxes 
were arranged in a horizontal line as they were during training, but participants were 
required to respond with their thumbs rather than their fingers. The left thumb was 
used to operate the X, C and V keys, and the right thumb was used to operate the B, N 
and M keys.
Free generation. Participants were informed for the first time that the asterisks had 
followed a repeating sequence during the experiment. They were asked to press the 
keys 100 times, attempting to generate the sequence that they had experienced during 
training and at the beginning o f each subsequent test. They were told that they could 
proceed at their own pace, and that their keypresses would have no effect on the
48
stimulus array, i.e. a static image o f the horizontal line o f boxes representing stimulus 
locations.
2.1.2 Results and Discussion
A mean RT for each participant in each block was calculated after exclusion o f RTs 
greater than 1000ms (as is usual in SRT experiments, see e.g. Reber & Squire, 1998) 
Each analysis of RT data was accompanied by a parallel analysis o f error data. The 
error data from all three experiments are shown in Table 1. The results o f error 
analyses are reported only if  they yielded significant effects or interactions. For all 
analyses, all significant effects are reported.
TEST Initial Test
Stimulus Transfer Test 
(Expts 1 and 2)
Anatomical Transfer Test 
(Expt 3)
Response Transfer Test 
(Expts 1 and 2)
Response Location Test 
(Expt 3)
SEQUENCE Training New Training New Training New
EX
PT
1
Observe
Sequence 2.8/0.4 3.0/0.7 4.4/0.8 6.6/0.8 5.2/1.4 4.9/1.1
Control 3.0/0.7 3.9/0.8 4.2/0.9 5.5/0.9 6.5/1.6 8.7/2.7
E
X
PT
2 ObserveSequence 1.9/0.6 3.2/0.6 7.3/1.5 1 2 /2 3 4.6/1.2 6.4/2.5
Control 2.3/0.5 2.4/0.7 4.7/0.8 5.3/1.0 7.9/1.8 6.1/1.3
E
X
PT
3 ObserveSequence 3.9/0.5 5.1/0.8 17.4/1.4 16.0/1.8 14.9/1.4 17.7/1.8
Control 2.6/0.4 2.7/0.5 12.3/2.4 11.8/2.1 9.6/1.5 9.4/1.4
Table 1. Mean (+- standard error) percentage error for training and new sequences in initial 
and transfer tests for each group in Experiments 1-3.
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One-way ANOVA with group as a between-subjects factor indicated that in the 
familiarization phase, when participants were responding to random targets, the RTs 
of observers (M = 597, SEM =14) and controls (M = 598, SEM = 22) did not differ 
(F<1).
Figure 1 presents mean RTs to training and new sequence blocks during initial and 
transfer testing for each o f the two groups o f participants. In the initial test, RTs in the 
first and third blocks, when participants were responding to the training sequence, 
were compared with RTs in the second block, when they were responding to a new 
sequence. In order to analyse these data a difference score was calculated for each 
participant by subtracting their average RT on the sequence with which they were 
trained, from their RT on the new sequence block. These difference scores were then 
analysed using univariate ANOVA with group (Observe Sequence and Control) as the 
between-subjects factor. A significant effect o f group was revealed (F(i, 22) = 5.88, p = 
0.02). Thus, introduction o f the new sequence was associated with a greater increase 
in RTs in the observers than the controls, suggesting that the former group had 
learned the sequence by observing the experimenter's fingers while he was performing 
the task.
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Figure 1 - Mean RT in initial and transfer test blocks for groups that had observed a model's 
fingers as he responded to the training sequence (Observe Sequence) or solved unrelated 
anagram problems (Control) during training in Experiment 1.
RT data from the stimulus transfer test were analyzed using two-way ANOVA with 
group (Observe Sequence and Control) and test order (before and after the response 
transfer test) as between-subjects factors. This revealed a significant effect o f group 
(F(i,20) = 6.15, p = 0.02). When the same two-way ANOVA was applied to RT data 
from the response transfer test, the effect o f group was not reliable (F<1). There were 
no effects o f test order in any analysis.
Thus, when the stimulus array, which was horizontal during training and initial 
testing, was presented vertically, introduction o f the new sequence had a more 
detrimental effect on the performance o f observers than on that o f controls. This 
indicates that, in spite o f the change in the stimulus array, the observers were still able 
to use their sequence knowledge. However, when participants were required to use
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their thumbs rather than their fingers to press the response keys, the transition from 
the training to the new sequence had the same impact on the performance o f observers 
and controls. This implies that, when responding with their thumbs, the observers 
were unable to use the sequence knowledge they had gained during training, and is 
therefore consistent with the hypothesis that the sequence knowledge they acquired by 
observation was effector-dependent.
In the free generation test, participants created sequences o f 100 key presses based on 
what they had learned about the training sequence. Data were coded as 98 consecutive 
response triplets and the number o f triplets that were consistent with the training 
sequence (2-5-1-4-6-3), was compared with the number that were consistent with the 
new sequence (4-2-6-3-1-5). A difference score was calculated as in the analysis of 
RT data, the number o f triplets produced from the new sequence was subtracted from 
the number o f triplets produced from the training sequence. Thus, if  a participant 
generated the sequence 2-5-1-5-4 at some point during the free generation test, this 
would be coded as triplets 2-5-1, 5-1-5, and 1-5-4. The first o f these triplets is 
consistent with the training sequence, whereas the third is consistent with the new 
sequence. Given that the participants had already completed three blocks o f trials with 
the ’new' sequence, this was a conservative test o f explicit knowledge, but it was 
passed by the observers. Figure 2 shows the mean number o f training and new triplets 
generated by participants in the two groups. Univariate ANOVA with group (Observe 
Sequence and Control) as a between-subjects factor, indicated a significant effect of 
group (F(i,22) = 7.00, p = 0.02)
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Figure 2 Mean (+- standard error) number o f training and new triplets generated in the free 
generation test by groups that had observed a model's fingers as he responded to the training 
sequence (Observe Sequence) or solved unrelated anagram problems (Control) during
training in Experiment 1.
The results of Experiment 1 suggest that participants can learn a six-item sequence by 
observing a model’s responses to the SRT task, and that the sequence knowledge 
gained through observation was effector-dependent; it could only be expressed by the 
effectors observed during training. Observers were also aware of their knowledge and 
were able to freely generate more of the sequence than controls.
2.2 Experiment 2
Experiment 1 provided evidence of effector-dependent, explicit, sequence learning by 
observation using an untrained control group. While the observers were watching the 
experimenter perform the SRT task, control participants in Experiment 1 completed 
anagram problems. This kind of control is of limited value because it means that, in
□  Train ing Trip lets
□  New Trip lets
1,  '
O bserve Sequence Control
Group
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addition to being unable to acquire sequence information by observation, controls 
have less opportunity than observers to familiarize themselves with general task 
demands. As a consequence o f being less familiar with, for example, response 
locations, untrained control participants may acquire sequence information more 
slowly than observers during test blocks in which all participants respond to the 
training sequence. If this is the case, observers may provide evidence o f more 
sequence knowledge in initial and transfer tests, not because they acquired this 
information by observation, but because they learned more than controls on test. To 
overcome this problem, a more subtle control procedure was used in Experiment 2. 
During the training phase, both groups watched a model's fingers. As in Experiment 
1, the model observed by Group Observe Sequence was responding to stimuli 
presented in the training sequence. However, the model observed by control 
participants, Group Observe Random, was responding to stimuli presented in random 
order.
Experiment 2 differed from Experiment 1 in two further respects. First, to achieve 
better stimulus control, the model's finger movements were presented on video, rather 
than live. Second, a recognition test, rather than a free generation test, was used at the 
end o f the experiment to assess whether sequence knowledge was implicit or explicit. 
This substitution was made because, as a measure of explicit knowledge, the free 
generation test may be contaminated by sensitivity to implicit motor learning. The 
observers in Experiment 1 may have passed the free generation test, not because their 
knowledge of the sequence was consciously accessible, but because they executed a 
learned motor program, the contents o f which were not available to conscious 
awareness. Motor learning o f this kind could not explain success on a recognition test
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in which participants respond to, and then rate their familiarity with, sequences 
derived from the training sequence and from an alternative, new sequence.
If participants are able to learn effector-dependent, explicit, sequence information by 
observation, the pattern o f results obtained in Experiment 2 should be the same as that 
obtained in Experiment 1.
2.2.1 Method
Participants. A further 24 volunteers participated in the experiment, 12 in each of 
Groups Observe Sequence and Observe Random. Their mean age was 30.08 years and 
12 were male. Two participants who made more than 10% errors during the random 
and initial test blocks were replaced.
Procedure. The procedure was exactly the same as for Experiment 1 except as noted. 
During the training phase, the control participants, in Group Observe Random, 
observed a model's fingers as he responded to target stimuli presented in random 
order. Participants in both groups, Observe Screen and Observe Random, viewed 
video recordings o f the model's finger movements played full screen on a 38-cm, TFT 
Active Matrix Display computer screen. Each o f the model's hands subtended 
approximately 26.5° o f visual angle. The images were recorded using a Sony digital 
camcorder, encoded as AVI (720 x 576 pixels) files, and displayed on an IBM 
compatible laptop computer using Microsoft Windows Media Player. The video 
frame included all eight o f the model's fingers, the response keys, and four rows of 
keys above the response keys. The viewing angle was similar to that o f ones own
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hands while typing (see Figure 3). When filmed for Group Observe Sequence, the 
model's mean RT ranged from 347ms to 398 ms across blocks, and he made no errors. 
When filmed for Group Observe Random, his mean RT ranged from 501 ms to 543 
ms across blocks, and he made no errors.
Figure 3 A frame from the training video presented to the Observe Sequence group in 
Experiments 2 and 3, showing the model making a response with the index finger o f his left
hand.
In the final phase of the experiment, participants were given a recognition test. They 
were told that they would be presented with sequences of six asterisk locations, 
presented in the standard, horizontal array of boxes. They were to respond to these 
stimuli as they had during training and initial testing, and then give a rating of how 
confident they were that the test sequence was the same as the sequence used during 
training and initial testing. Ratings were made on a scale from 1 to 6, where 1 = 
certain I  have not seen the sequence before, 2 - fairly certain I  have not seen the 
sequence before, 3 - guess I  have not seen the sequence before, 4 - guess I  have seen 
the sequence before, 5 - fairly certain I  have seen the sequence before, and 6 -certain
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I  have seen this sequence before. Both ratings and trial-by-trial RTs were recorded. 
There were 12 test sequences in total, presented in random order. Six 'old' sequences 
were derived from the training sequence, and six 'new' sequences were derived from 
the sequence: 1-3-5-4-2-6. One sequence in each o f these groups started at each serial 
location.
2.2.2 Results and Discussion
Results were analyzed in the same way as those o f Experiment 1. One-way ANOVA 
indicated that in the familiarization phase, when participants were responding to 
random targets, the RTs of Group Observe Sequence (M = 611, SEM = 20) and of 
Group Observe Random (M = 610, SEM = 22) did not differ (F<1).
Figure 4 presents mean RTs to training and new sequences during initial and transfer 
testing for each o f the two groups. Univariate ANOVA of the initial test data 
indicated a significant effect o f group (F(i, 22) = 5.92, p = 0.02). Thus, introduction o f 
the new sequence was associated with a greater increase in RTs in the Group Observe 
Sequence, than in Group Observe Random, indicating observational learning o f the 
sequence by participants in the former group.
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Figure 4 Mean RT in initial and transfer test blocks for groups that had observed a model’s 
fingers as he responded to the training sequence (Observe Sequence) or to a random sequence 
(Observe Random) during training in Experiment 2.
As in Experiment 1, two-way ANOVA of the RT data from the stimulus transfer test 
yielded a significant effect o f group (F(i,20) = 4.13, p = 0.05), but the same analysis of 
the response transfer test indicated no significant effects or interactions.
Analysis o f the recognition test followed a different format from that o f the test 
blocks. The purpose o f the recognition test was to assess how aware members o f each 
group were o f any sequence knowledge they have acquired. To this end, two sources 
o f data were collected during the test; mean RT to each sequence and a rating o f its 
familiarity. Evidence o f implicit knowledge was provided when members o f a group 
demonstrated sequence knowledge by responding faster to training than new sequence 
fragments, while rating both sequences as equally familiar. In contrast, explicit 
knowledge was shown when training sequences were responded to faster than new 
sequences, and were rated as more familiar. Separate analyses were performed on the
Observe Sequence 
Observe Random
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RT and rating data to identify sequence knowledge shown by any group on each 
measure. For each participant, average RT to, and average rating of, training and new 
sequences was calculated. Group means are given in Table 2.
Group Mean Rating Mean Rating Mean RT Mean RT
Training New Training New
(SEM) (SEM) (SEM) (SEM)
Observe Sequence 4.13 3.26 538 592
(0.24) (0.16) (26.9) (22.2)
Observe 3.79 3.86 563 575
Random (0.16) (0.13) (28.8) (26.9)
Table 2. Mean (+- standard error) reaction times (RTs) and recognition ratings given to 
training and new sequences by groups that had observed a model's fingers as he responded to 
the training sequence (Observe Sequence) or to a random sequence (Observe Random) during
training in Experiment 2.
Two-way ANOVA applied to the RT data, with group (Observe Sequence and 
Observe Random) and sequence type (training and new) as factors, indicated 
significant effects o f sequence type, F(i,22) = 9.61, p = .005, and a marginally 
significant group x sequence interaction, F(i,22) = 4.00, p = .06. Simple effects analysis 
revealed a significant difference in RT to training and new sequences for the Observe 
Sequence group (F(i,22) = 13, p = 0.002), but not for the Control group (F<1).
Parallel analysis o f the recognition rating data yielded the same pattern o f results; a 
main effect o f sequence type, F(i,22) = 4.19, p = .05, and a significant interaction, F(i,22) 
= 5.80, p = .03. Simple effects analysis showed that the difference in ratings given to 
training and new sequences was significant for the Observe Sequence group (F(i,22) = 
9.92, p = 0.005), but not for the Control group (F<1).
59
Thus, although Experiment 2 involved a more subtle control group, video presentation 
o f finger movement stimuli, and a recognition test o f explicit knowledge, the pattern 
o f  results was exactly the same as that of Experiment 1.
2.3 Experim ent 3
In combination, Experiments 1 and 2 provide compelling evidence that participants 
can learn a six-item sequence by observing a model's finger movements, and that this 
sequence knowledge is accessible to conscious awareness. It could be argued, 
however, that the foregoing experiments do not provide equally strong evidence that 
observational sequence learning can be effector-dependent. This hypothesis rests on 
the finding that, in Experiments 1 and 2, the transition from the training sequence to a 
new sequence was associated with greater RT elevation in observers than in controls 
when they were responding to targets in a transformed stimulus array, but not when 
they were responding with their thumbs rather than their fingers. This finding is 
consistent with effector-dependence o f observational sequence learning, but is also 
susceptible to an alternative explanation. It is possible that what was learned by 
observation was a sequence o f response locations encoded in an effector-independent 
fashion, either symbolically or as locations in egocentric space (Willingham, 1999). If 
the stimulus transfer test, in which the stimulus array was vertical, and the response 
transfer test, in which participants responded with their thumbs, were o f equal 
sensitivity, effector-independent knowledge o f a sequence o f response locations 
should be evident in both. However, it could be that, in Experiments 1 and 2, no 
evidence o f sequence knowledge was detected in the response transfer test because 
that test was less sensitive than the stimulus transfer test. The participants may have
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found it difficult to use their thumbs to press the keys, and this may have interfered 
with expression o f effector-independent sequence knowledge about response 
locations.
To address this problem, an alternative transfer test procedure was used in Experiment 
3. After training and initial testing, all participants crossed their hands on the 
keyboard for two transfer tests. This manipulation allowed the sequence o f finger 
movements to be dissociated from the sequence o f response locations. The sequence 
of finger movements made during training produced a novel sequence o f response 
locations and vice versa. The anatomical transfer test compared RTs to a sequence of 
screen targets which preserved the finger movement sequence used during training 
with RTs to a sequence o f screen targets which produced a new sequence o f finger 
movements. The response location transfer test compared RTs to the training 
sequence o f screen targets with RTs to a new sequence o f screen targets. The training 
sequence o f screen targets in the response location test preserved the sequence of 
response locations used during training, but neither of the target sequences in the 
anatomical test preserved the training sequence o f response locations. Therefore, if  
Group Observe Sequence learned a sequence o f response locations during training, 
but not an effector-dependent sequence o f finger movements, then, relative to Group 
Observe Random, they should be slower to respond to the new than to the training 
sequence in the response location test but not in the anatomical test. In contrast, if 
Group Observe Sequence learned an effector-dependent sequence o f finger 
movements during training and did not learn a sequence of response locations, then, 
relative to Group Observe Random, they should be slower to respond to the new than 
to the training sequence in the anatomical test but not in the response location test.
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The occurrence o f a group by sequence interaction effect in both tests would imply 
that Group Observe Sequence had learned both an effector-dependent sequence of 
finger movements and a sequence o f response locations during training.
2.3.1 M ethod
Participants. A further 48 volunteers participated in the experiment, 24 in each of 
Groups Observe Sequence and Observe Random. Their mean age was 22.17 years and 
15 were male. Eight participants who made more than 10% errors during the random 
and initial test blocks were replaced.
Procedure. The procedure was exactly the same as for Experiment 2 except as noted. 
The experiment had four phases: familiarization, training, initial testing and transfer.
Transfer. After initial testing, all participants were asked to cross their hands so that 
keys X, C and V were operated by the index, middle and ring finger o f the right hand, 
respectively, whereas keys B, N, and M were operated by the ring, middle and index 
fingers of the left hand, respectively. With their hands crossed, they completed, in 
counterbalanced order, two transfer tests each consisting o f three blocks o f 100 target 
location trials.
In the first and third 'training' blocks of the anatomical test, screen targets were 
presented in the sequence 5-2-4-1-3-6. This sequence has no transitions in common 
with the training sequence o f screen stimuli (2-5-1-4-6-3), i.e. each target is 
immediately followed by a different target than it was during training. Given that the
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target locations and the response locations were spatially compatible, this also means 
that the sequence of response locations associated with this sequence had no 
transitions in common with the training sequence o f response locations. However, in 
the context o f the anatomical test, the target sequence 5-2-4-1-3-6 constitutes the 
training sequence because correct responses occur in the finger movement sequence 
observed during training. Where R = right, L = left, i = index, m = middle and r = 
ring, this sequence was Lm-Rm-Lr-Ri-Rr-Li. In the second 'new' block o f the 
anatomical test, screen targets were presented in the sequence 2-1-5-3-6-4. This 
sequence has no transitions in common with the training sequence o f targets and 
response locations, and just one transition (Rr-Li) in common with the training 
sequence o f finger movements.
In the first and third blocks o f the response location transfer test, target stimuli were 
presented in the training sequence, i.e. the sequence o f screen stimuli and response 
locations had all six transitions in common with those used during training. In the 
second block, targets were presented in the sequence 4-2-6-3-1-5, which has only one 
transition in common with the training sequence. Given that the hands were crossed, 
both o f the sequences presented in the response location transfer test produced finger 
movement sequences which did not have any transitions in common with the finger 
movement sequence used during training.
2.3.2 Results and Discussion
Owing to the difficulty o f performing the task with crossed hands, RTs greater than 
1000ms were not removed from the data prior to analysis. One-way ANOVA
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indicated that in the familiarization phase, when participants were responding to 
random targets, the RTs o f Group Observe Sequence (M = 526, SEM = 12) and of 
Group Observe Random (M = 552, SEM = 13) did not differ (FI, 46 = 2.04).
Figure 5 presents mean RTs to the training sequence and the new sequence during 
initial and transfer testing for each o f the two groups. Univariate ANOVA of the 
initial test data indicated a significant effect o f group (F(i, 46) = 6.78, p = 0.01). Thus, 
as in the previous experiments, introduction o f the new sequence was associated with 
a greater increase in RTs in the Group Observe Sequence, than in Group Observe 
Random, indicating observational learning of the sequence by participants in the 
former group.
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Figure 5 Mean RT in initial and transfer test blocks for groups that had observed a model's 
fingers as he responded to the training sequence (Observe Sequence) or to a random sequence 
(Observe Random) during training in Experiment 3.
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The anatomical and response location tests were each analyzed in the same way as 
initial test data. Two-way ANOVA of the RT data from the anatomical test, in which 
group and transfer test order were between-subjects factors, yielded a significant 
effect o f group (F(i,44) = 5.10, p = 0.03). This effect of group shows that the difference 
in RT between training and new sequence blocks was greater for Group Observe 
Sequence than Group Observe Random, and implies that Group Observe Sequence 
had learned an effector-dependent sequence o f finger movements by observation.
The results o f the response location test did not provide any evidence o f effector- 
independent learning by observation o f a sequence of response locations. Two-way 
ANOVA of the RT data from this test indicated that the effect o f group was not 
significant (F<1).
Inspection o f mean RT to training and new sequences suggests that both groups had 
some knowledge o f the training sequence o f response locations by the time they 
completed the response location test. However, the impact on RTs o f the transition 
from the training to the new sequence was the same for the two groups, and therefore 
the response location test provided no evidence that participants in Group Observe 
Sequence acquired knowledge about the sequence of response locations by 
observation, rather than during testing.
In combination, the results o f the anatomical and response location tests are consistent 
with the hypothesis that Group Observe Sequence learned by observation an effector- 
dependent sequence o f finger movements, and not a sequence o f response locations.
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2.4 General Discussion
The critical question addressed by the present experiments is whether observational 
learning o f a finger movement sequence can be effector-dependent. Experiments 1 
and 2  provided evidence o f effector-dependence in the form of a dissociation between 
two transfer tests: Relative to controls who had not been exposed to the sequence 
during the training phase, participants who had observed the model performing the 
finger movement sequence responded faster to the training sequence than to a novel 
sequence when they were using their fingers to press the keys (stimulus transfer test), 
but not when they were using their thumbs (response transfer test). Experiment 3 
provided further evidence o f effector-dependence by controlling for the possibility 
that the dissociation reported in Experiments 1 and 2 was due to a difference between 
the stimulus and response transfer tests in their sensitivity to effector-independent 
knowledge o f a sequence o f response locations. For both transfer tests in Experiment 
3, participants' hands were crossed on the keyboard. In the anatomical crossed-hands 
test, stimuli were presented in two sequences, both o f which generated a sequence of 
response locations distinct from that observed during training. In spite o f this, relative 
to controls, participants who had observed the model performing the finger movement 
sequence during training responded faster to stimuli that generated the observed 
finger movement sequence than to stimuli that generated a different finger movement 
sequence. Thus, the skill learned by observation did not transfer across fingers. The 
two stimulus sequences presented in the response location crossed-hands transfer test 
both generated sequences o f finger movements that differed from those seen by the 
experimental group during training, but one o f them did, and the other did not, 
conserve the training sequence o f response locations. Participants who had observed
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the model performing the finger movement sequence responded faster to the stimulus 
sequence which generated the training sequence o f response locations than to the 
alternative stimulus sequence, but this effect was also found in the control group. This 
implies that, in addition to their effector-dependent knowledge o f the sequence of 
finger movements, the experimental group had some knowledge of the sequence of 
response locations. However, it also suggests the information about response locations 
was acquired during testing, i.e. while practicing, rather than by observation.
Effector-dependent learning by observation of a finger movement sequence is 
consistent with the ASL model o f observational learning because it proposes that 
movement observation can activate motor representations directly, i.e. without 
intermediate representation in a code that is neither perceptual nor motoric. The 
results of the present experiments are harder to reconcile with theories which assume 
that observational learning is invariably mediated by amodal representations (AIM). 
These results are also hard to reconcile with the view o f imitation described by 
Ideomotor Theory, in which imitation always has the potential to be carried out by 
higher-order, effector-independent, cognitive action representations. Neither AIM nor 
Ideomotor theories o f imitation specify the nature o f amodal or higher-order, 
cognitive codes, but they both imply that these codes are o f a kind that supports a 
broad range o f inferences. Therefore, to accommodate the transfer effects found in the 
present experiments, these theories would have 1 ) to assume that participants initially 
represented the observed sequence o f finger movements in a symbolic or amodal code 
with anatomical content (e.g. in linguistic form: "left middle - right middle - left ring - 
right index - right ring - left index") rather than abstract content (e.g. "response 
location 2 - 5 - 1 - 4 - 6  -3), and 2) to explain why, given background knowledge of
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finger locations and corresponding screen locations, the former could not be translated 
into the latter so that sequence knowledge could be used in response transfer 
(Experiments 1 and 2) and response location transfer (Experiment 3) tests.
In connection with the first o f these requirements, it is important to note that the 
results of the free generation and recognition tests do not show that the participants in 
the experimental groups had sequence knowledge represented in a symbolic or 
amodal code with anatomical content. As discussed in the introduction to Experiment 
2 , successful performance in the free generation test may reflect implicit, or 
consciously inaccessible, effector-dependent learning. The recognition test provides a 
better measure o f explicit knowledge, but successful performance in this kind o f test 
may be based on a consciously accessible experience o f perceptual-motor fluency 
(Shanks & Johnstone, 1999). Thus, when participants respond to a sequence and then 
immediately rate its familiarity, it does not imply that their rating is based on 
consciously accessible knowledge that, for example, "movement of the left middle 
finger is followed by movement of the right middle finger". Instead, participants may 
base their rating on conscious perception of the fluency with which they responded to 
the sequence, and movement fluency may itself be a function of nonsymbolic, 
effector-dependent sequence representation.
These results imply that observational sequence learning can be both explicit and 
effector-dependent. This is consistent with previous studies o f observational learning 
using the SRT task which report evidence that observers had acquired sequence 
knowledge only when post-test interview indicated that they had explicit knowledge 
of the sequence (Howard, Mutter, & Howard, 1992; Kelly & Burton, 2001;
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Willingham, 1999). However, the present results are not consistent with a model o f 
motor skill learning which proposes that effector-dependent knowledge is implicit, 
whereas effector-independent knowledge is explicit (Hikosaka et al, 2002). In 
combination with recently reported evidence o f implicit, effector-independent, 
practice-based learning (Japikse, Negash, Howard, & Howard, 2003), the present 
results therefore imply that these relationships are not invariant either for practice- 
based or for observational sequence learning.
In Experiment 3, participants who had observed the model performing the finger 
movement sequence did not show any advantage over controls in the response 
location transfer test, and therefore this test did not provide any evidence of 
observational learning. However, both groups responded faster with the training 
sequence o f response locations than with the alternative sequence, a finding which is 
consistent with Willingham’s (1999) suggestion that performance (rather than 
observation) o f an SRT task supports learning about response locations.
In conclusion: Experiments in this chapter have suggested that effector-dependent 
representations can be formed by observation. This conclusion is incompatible with 
both AIM and Ideomotor theories of imitation due to their specification o f flexible, 
higher-order representations which enable (AIM), or accompany (Ideomotor Theory), 
imitation. In contrast, the formation of effector-dependent representations through 
observation is predicted by ASL.
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Chapter 3: The Role of Awareness in Imitation
Whether imitation is invariably an active, intentional, goal-directed process is a topic 
o f theoretical dispute. The AIM model o f imitation argues that imitation always has 
the above qualities. According to this model, the process o f imitation is conscious and 
effortful in nature. Initially, the goal of a model’s action is inferred from the model’s 
movements (Meltzoff, 1995), and enables the imitator to decide which movement 
features to imitate. The present state o f the imitator’s body is then actively compared 
with the desired state, and corrections are made if  necessary (Gleissner, Meltzoff, & 
Bekkering, 2000; M eltzoff & Decety, 2003; Meltzoff & Moore, 1997). This view of 
imitation can be contrasted with those o f the ASL and Ideomotor theories of imitation. 
Both theories posit that, under certain conditions, imitation may occur automatically, 
without effortful processing (see Chapter 1 for a more detailed discussion).
Research which has investigated the intentionality o f imitation suggests that in a 
variety o f situations imitation can occur automatically, without intention, and in some 
cases counter to intention. Examples o f unintentional imitation include studies 
detailing; unconscious and involuntary mimicry o f other’s mannerisms and behaviour 
in social situations (e.g. Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; Lakin and Chartrand, 2003), and 
compulsive imitation after frontal lobe damage (Lhermitte, Pillon, & Serdaru, 1986). 
However, awareness in the former group o f experiments is measured using a verbal 
report measure which has been argued to be insufficient to detect unconscious 
knowledge o f behaviour (see section 1.4.2 o f Chapter 1). The second group of 
experiments demonstrate unconscious imitation in brain-damaged patients, and the 
generalisability o f these results to healthy adults has not been established.
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Research demonstrating movement compatibility effects (see section 1.3.1.1 of 
Chapter 1) also suggest that imitation can occur unconsciously. These studies imply 
that perception o f an action primes the production o f that action in the perceiver even 
when observed movements are task-irrelevant (Brass, Bekkering, Wohlschlager, & 
Prinz, 2000; Stunner, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2000), or opposed to the required 
response movement (Brass, Bekkering, & Prinz, 2001; Kerzel & Bekkering, 2000). 
However, even this research does not definitively show unconscious imitation: even 
though participants were not instructed to imitate in these experiments they may still 
be prompted to imitate by action observation, or be aware o f the effect o f the observed 
movement on their behaviour. In addition, these experiments do not use an imitation 
task: participants make either a pre-defined response to any observed movement or do 
not base responses on the observed movement type.
Thus, several research areas lend support to the hypothesis that imitation may occur 
unconsciously. However, problems or limitations o f this research mean that it cannot 
be concluded with any degree of certainty that unconscious imitation does occur. This 
chapter investigates whether imitation o f novel behaviour, (in particular o f novel 
finger-movement sequences), can occur automatically. If unconscious imitation is 
demonstrated, then the AIM characterisation o f imitation as an active, effortful, goal- 
directed process will be called into question. Methodological issues in experiments 2 
and 3 (Chapter 2) mean that these experiments were not sufficient in establishing how 
aware participants were o f any sequence knowledge gained through observation. The 
tests o f awareness in these experiments were completed after transfer tests designed to
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elucidate sequence encoding. Thus, the results o f the tests of awareness may have 
been contaminated by performance of the transfer tests.
In order to investigate whether learning through imitation is conscious or 
unconscious, the SRT task used in Chapter 2 will again be utilised here, but without 
the addition o f transfer tests. This task, in combination with a test of explicit 
knowledge, has been widely used to study participants’ awareness o f learned 
information (e.g. Nissen & Bullemer, 1987; Shanks & Channon, 2002; Shanks & 
Johnstone, 1999; Willingham, Nissen, & Bullemer, 1989).
Using this task, some researchers have claimed to show practice-based learning which 
is not accompanied by awareness i.e. implicit knowledge. These experimenters have 
commonly used a four-location version o f the SRT task with a 12-item second-order 
conditional (SOC) sequence coupled with a test o f explicit knowledge (e.g. Exner, 
Koschack, & Irle, 2002; Kelly & Burton, 2001; Reber & Squire, 1998). SOC 
sequences are constructed so that the next stimulus can only be predicted by knowing 
the previous two stimuli. SRT and recognition tests are used in the present 
experiments to investigate whether participants who observe the responses of an 
expert model can learn a 12-item SOC sequence, and whether they are aware o f any 
movement information learned through imitation.
It is a contentious issue whether participants can learn a 12-item SOC sequence 
through observation in an SRT task. While clear evidence o f observational sequence 
learning has been provided by Heyes and Foster (2002) and the experiments reported 
in Chapter 2, these experiments used a 6 -item unique sequence. Several experiments
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have found differences between learning o f sequences in which transitions are simple 
(as in a unique sequence), compared to sequences with a more complex structure 
(such as SOC sequences). These differences include; a greater effect o f dual tasks 
(Cohen, Ivry, & Keele, 1990 experiments 3 and 4), and age (Howard & Howard,
1997; 2001), on learning o f complex sequences, a positive effect o f the intention to 
learn on simple but not complex sequences (Curran & Keele, 1993), and most 
importantly for this study - that observational sequence learning is more likely to 
occur for short, simple sequences (Howard, Mutter, & Howard, 1992).
Using a 12-item SOC sequence, Kelly and Burton (2001) compared the ability of 
observers to learn the sequence with that o f participants who practiced the sequence 
by responding to stimuli during training. In the first o f their experiments, observers 
watched a practice participant complete the training blocks. On test, practice 
participants demonstrated implicit sequence knowledge while observers did not 
demonstrate sequence knowledge on either the SRT test, or on a generation test of 
explicit knowledge. A non-spatial version o f the SRT task was used in Kelly and 
Burton’s second experiment. Instead of spatial location, the colour o f a centrally- 
located circle signalled the correct response. In this study observers watched stimulus 
presentation only; responses to the stimuli were not observed. Results from the second 
experiment matched those o f the first: practice participants showed implicit learning 
o f the sequence, while observers did not show learning on any test. Kelly and Burton 
(2001) concluded that observational learning in the SRT task is necessarily explicit 
and is therefore not shown when sequence properties encourage implicit learning.
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Kelly, Burton, Riedel and Lynch (2003) found evidence supporting this conclusion 
when they compared sequence knowledge gained through observation o f screen 
stimuli with that gained through physical practice and manipulated participants’ 
awareness of the sequence. Half o f the participants in each group were trained using 
the normal SRT task, and the other half were trained on sequences which had been 
broken up into triplets through the use of colour. It was expected that making the 
sequence more salient through the use of colour would lead to greater levels of 
explicit knowledge. Upon test, sequence knowledge was shown by both o f the 
practice groups, but only by observers who had explicit knowledge o f the sequence 
due to the colour manipulation. Thus, practice participants were able to learn the 
sequence implicitly but observers were not.
Two further experiments provide support for Kelly and Burton’s claim that sequences 
cannot be learned implicitly through observation. Howard et al (1992) found sequence 
knowledge gained by observation of screen stimuli to be highly explicit and 
equivalent to physical practice on SRT and free generation tasks. A replication o f this 
study showed that observational learning was only shown by those participants who 
exhibited high levels o f explicit knowledge about the sequence (Willingham, 1999).
In addition to these studies, an experiment using the sugar production task, a task 
which has been argued to be analogous to the SRT task (Kelly & Burton, 2001), 
found that observation could support learning o f a salient, explicit rule, but action was 
necessary in order to learn the non-salient, implicit rule (Berry, 1991).
Although the majority o f studies suggest that implicit learning is not possible by 
observation, Seger (1997) claims to have shown implicit observational learning using
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the SRT task. Seger compared learning and awareness after either practice or stimulus 
observation o f a 10-item sequence. Testing revealed that observers had gained as 
much sequence knowledge as practice participants. For a subset o f observers who 
demonstrated low explicit knowledge by verbal report, learning was implicit as 
measured by recognition tests.
The purposes o f the experiments reported in Chapter 1 were to 1) establish whether 
participants can learn a 1 2 -item SOC sequence through observation o f a model’s 
responses; 2 ) compare the amount o f sequence knowledge gained through observation 
o f stimuli alone, observation o f stimuli and responses, and physical practice, and 3) 
investigate how aware participants are o f any sequence knowledge gained through 
training.
3.1 Experiment 4
Experiment 4 investigated whether observers could learn a 12-item SOC sequence in 
comparison with untrained controls using the SRT task. An untrained control group 
was thought to be appropriate as the only experiment to assess observational learning 
o f a 12-item SOC sequence (Kelly and Burton, 2001) found no sign o f observational 
learning (even when observers were compared to untrained control participants on a 
generation test). Thus, this experiment sought to identify any effect o f observational 
learning by comparing observers with participants who had no opportunity to learn 
the sequence.
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Experiment 4 tested for observational sequence learning using parameters which 
have been shown to encourage implicit practice-based learning. If observational 
sequence learning is demonstrated, these parameters will be used to assess how aware 
participants are o f any sequence knowledge gained through observation in Experiment
5. For this reason, a 12-item SOC sequence was used as the training sequence. The 
majority o f studies which have reported implicit practice-based learning have used 
12-item SOC sequences (e.g. Exner, Koschack, & Irle, 2002; Kelly & Burton, 2001; 
Reber & Squire, 1998).
Two types o f observational training were given in this experiment. Participants either 
viewed stimulus presentation, or viewed both stimulus presentation and the responses 
o f an expert model. By definition, imitation learning consists o f learning by 
observation o f a model’s responses, rather than o f the stimuli guiding those responses. 
However, experiments on observational sequence learning typically ask participants 
to view stimuli in the absence o f a model’s response. Both observer groups are 
included here in order to 1 ) increase the relevance o f these experiments to the existing 
literature on observational learning, and 2 ) as comparison o f the two groups with 
respect to observational learning (Experiment 4) and awareness of knowledge 
(Experiment 5) may reveal theoretically important differences between learning 
through imitation, and learning through observation o f inanimate stimuli.
The influence o f the amount o f training given to participants was also investigated; 
half o f each observation group were presented with 64 sequence cycles during 
training, while the remaining participants were presented with 96. Thus, the 
experiment consisted of a familiarisation phase in which all participants physically
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responded to one block o f the SRT task with random stimulus presentation in order to 
gain task practice without being exposed to the training sequence. Training, which 
followed the familiarisation phase, was completed according to group membership. 
Participants in Group Observe Screen watched stimuli which followed the training 
sequence in the absence o f any response. Participants in Group Observe Screen and 
Hands watched an expert model complete the usual SRT task and were instructed to 
pay equal attention to stimulus presentation and the model’s responses. Control 
participants completed anagrams for a similar period o f time. Sequence knowledge 
was tested using the SRT test. In one block stimulus presentation was governed by the 
training sequence and in a second block by a different 12-item SOC sequence. An RT 
increase upon transference to the new sequence was used as an index o f learning. If 
this increase is greater in observers than in control participants, then observational 
learning has been demonstrated.
3.1.1 Method
Participants. Seventy-two students at UCL participated in the experiment, 24 in each 
o f groups Observe Screen, Observe Screen and Hands, and Control. Their mean age 
was 23 years, 37 were male, and each was paid a small honorarium for their 
participation. Twelve participants who made more than 10% errors during the 
random and test blocks were replaced.
Stimuli & Apparatus. Stimulus presentation, RT measurement, and response 
recording were all implemented on IBM-compatible PCs with 43 cm colour monitors 
and standard QWERTY keyboards. Four boxes were presented in a horizontal row in 
the centre o f the screen, drawn with black lines against a grey background. The boxes
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were 2 . 2  cm wide and 1 .2  cm high, spaced 1 -cm apart, and viewed at a distance of 
approximately 60 cm. A white asterisk (Arial font size 36, subtending approximately
0.5° o f visual angle) appeared in the centre o f one o f these boxes on each target 
location trial. Target locations are referred to as 1-4 from left to right. Participants 
were instructed to indicate locations 1-4 as quickly as possible by using the V, B, N, 
and M keys located across the bottom of the keyboard, respectively. They operated 
the V and B keys with the ring, and index fingers o f their left hand, and the N, and M 
keys with the index, and ring fingers o f their right hand, respectively.
Each test block consisted o f 96 target location trials. Half of the participants in each 
group were trained with blocks consisting o f 96 trials, and the other half were trained 
with blocks o f 144 trials. Incorrect responses were signalled by a tone. A trial ended 
when a participant pressed the correct key, at which time the target was erased. The 
next trial began 200 ms later. Response latencies were measured from the onset o f the 
target to the completion o f a correct response.
Procedure. Participants were told that they were taking part in a choice RT task 
designed to measure their speed o f response. For all participants, the experiment had 
three phases: 1) familiarization, 2) training, and 3) testing. The three groups received 
identical treatment in all phases except the training phase. During training, Group 
Observe Screen and Hands (OS+H) watched the experimenter's fingers as she 
performed the SRT task, and also observed stimulus presentation i.e. the asterisk 
moving between the on-screen boxes. Group Observe Screen (OS) watched stimulus 
presentation only; the experimenter did not make responses. In order to approximately 
equate the inter-stimulus interval (ISI) between the two observation groups, the ISI
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was set at 500ms for Group Observe Screen. This duration is made up o f the standard 
length between a response and the next trial on test blocks (2 0 0 ms) plus the 
experimenter’s target RT for training blocks given to Group OS+H (300ms). Group 
Control (C) completed anagram problems for a comparable period o f time.
Familiarization. In the familiarization phase, participants were asked to complete one 
block o f 96 target location trials in which the order o f target presentation was 
randomly determined.
Training. Group OS+H were instructed to watch the experimenter's fingers, and the 
movement o f the stimulus on the screen, as she completed eight blocks o f target 
location trials. Participants were asked to pay equal attention to the screen and the 
experimenter’s fingers. The sequence o f targets in these blocks was 2-4-2-1-3-4-1-2- 
3-1-4-3, a 12-item second-order conditional sequence. Each block o f 96 or 144 trials 
included eight or 1 2  repetitions o f the whole training sequence, and began at a random 
point in that sequence. Observers in group OS+H were seated to the right, and just 
behind the experimenter, on a chair which had been raised to give them a slightly 
elevated view o f her fingers on the keyboard. The screen was turned slightly towards 
the observers so that they could see the target stimuli to which the experimenter was 
responding. The experimenter provided a model o f expert performance, with a mean 
RT over all experiments o f 330ms and an average error rate o f less than 1%. 
Participants in Group OS were seated in front o f the computer and were asked to 
watch the screen as the asterisk moved between stimulus locations. Asterisk 
presentation was governed by the same sequence as used for Group OS+H. For the
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duration o f the training period (9 minutes), participants in Group Control solved 
anagram problems.
Testing. The test o f sequence learning consisted o f two blocks o f target location 
trials, completed by all participants. In the first o f these blocks, targets were 
presented in the training sequence, i.e. 2-4-2-1-3-4-1-2-3-1-4-3. In the second block, 
they were presented in a new, 12-item SOC sequence: 2-4-1-3-2-1-4-2-3-4-3-1.
3.1.2 Results and Discussion
A mean RT for each participant in each block was calculated after exclusion o f RTs 
greater than 1000ms. Each analysis o f RT data was accompanied by a parallel 
analysis o f error data. The results o f error analyses are reported only if  they yielded 
significant effects or interactions. For all analyses, all significant effects are reported.
Initially results were analysed including amount o f training (64 or 96 sequence 
cycles), as a between-subjects factor. However, this factor did not interact 
significantly with any other factor, nor was it significant as a main effect in any 
analysis. Therefore, this variable was not included in the reported analyses.
Data from the initial familiarization stage were analysed using univariate ANOVA 
with group (OS+H, OS, and C) as a between-subjects factor. The effect o f group was 
not significant (F < 1), indicating that groups did not differ in their RT to random 
stimuli (Group OS+H M = 453 SEM =14, Group OS M = 451 SEM = 15 , Group C M 
= 450, SEM =13).
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In order to assess sequence knowledge on test, RTs in the training and new sequence 
blocks were compared. Mean RTs for each group on each block are shown in Figure
6. These data were analysed in the same manner as those in Chapter 2; a difference 
score was calculated for each participant by subtracting their RT on the sequence with 
which they were trained, from their RT on the new sequence block. These difference 
scores were then analysed using univariate ANOVA with group (OS+H, OS, and C) 
as a between-subjects factor. This analysis was supplemented by a Helmert contrast, 
comparing the control group to the two observation groups, and then Group OS+H 
with Group OS. The main effect o f Group was significant (F(2,69) = 3.7 p = 0.031), as 
was the contrast between the control (M = -10ms SEM = 5) and observation groups ( 
p = 0.01). The contrast between Group OS+H (M = 30 SEM = 15) and Group OS (M 
= 21 SEM =11) was not reliable.
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Figure 6 -  Mean RT to training and new sequenced blocks for groups that; observed screen 
stimuli and the model’s responses (Observe Screen and Hands), observed screen stimuli alone 
(Observe Screen), or completed anagram problems (Control), during training in Experiment
4.
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Thus, the results o f Experiment 4 demonstrated that observers are able to learn a 12- 
item SOC sequence. In addition, they suggested that the extent o f learning did not 
vary between a group which observed the model’s responses as well as the on-screen 
stimuli, and a group which observed the on-screen stimuli alone. Furthermore the 
amount o f training (64 vs. 96 sequence cycles) did not affect the amount o f sequence 
knowledge shown on test.
3.2 Experiment 5
Experiment 4 indicated that a 12-item SOC sequence can be learned by observation. 
Experiment 5 compared the amount o f sequence knowledge gained through 
observation, with that gained through physical practice. To this end, groups trained by 
observing the onscreen stimuli only (Group OS), and the onscreen stimuli and an 
expert model’s responses (Group OS+H), were compared to a practice group (Group 
P) which responded to onscreen stimuli. These groups were compared to an untrained 
control group. An untrained control group was used in Experiment 5 in order to 
provide a baseline from which both observational and practice-based learning could 
be measured. The alternative would have been to include 3 control groups: one of 
which responds to random stimuli in the training phase, one group which observes 
random stimuli in the training phase, and another which observes random stimuli and 
the responses o f an expert model to those stimuli. This strategy would have made 
comparison o f observational and practice-based learning problematic.
82
Observers were compared with practice participants in an attempt to explain 
conflicting results in the preceding literature and to test a revised version o f the claim 
by Kelly and Burton (2001) that action is necessary for implicit learning. Two recent 
experiments have compared observational and practice-based learning in the SRT task 
and obtained very different results. Kelly and Burton (2001) found significantly less 
learning o f a 12-item SOC sequence when observers were compared to practice 
participants. In contrast, Heyes and Foster (2002) found equivalent observational and 
practice-based learning o f a six-item unique sequence. A possible explanation for 
these conflicting results is that differences in structure and length between sequences 
used in the studies may have resulted in differing amounts o f observational learning. 
Howard, Mutter and Howard (1992) have shown that observational sequence learning 
is more likely to occur when sequences are short and have a simple structure. Thus, 
the use o f a six-item unique sequence in the study by Heyes and Foster (2002) would 
have resulted in high levels o f sequence knowledge, while the 1 2 -item SOC sequence 
used by Kelly and Burton (2001) would result in less learning. This hypothesis was 
indirectly tested in Experiment 5 by comparing observational and practice-based 
learning o f a 12-item SOC sequence. If practice and observer participants only 
showed equivalent learning due to the use o f a short, simple sequence in Heyes and 
Foster (2002), one would not expect these groups to show equivalent learning in 
Experiment 5.
In addition to a test o f sequence knowledge, recognition tests were performed in order 
to establish participants’ awareness o f any sequence knowledge gained through 
training. Experiments in this chapter are concerned with determining whether learning 
through imitation can be implicit. Results of Group OS+H, trained by observation of
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an expert model’s responses and screen stimuli, will provide an initial answer to this 
question. The performance o f the stimulus observation and practice groups will enable 
the following hypothesis to be tested.
Kelly and Burton (2001) have argued that action is necessary to learn implicitly, 
basing this claim on the large number o f studies to demonstrate implicit practice- 
based learning (e.g. Exner, Koschack, & Irle, 2002; Kelly & Burton, 2001; Reber & 
Squire, 1998), and studies which suggest that observers cannot learn implicitly (e.g. 
Berry, 1991; Howard et al, 1992; Kelly and Burton, 2001; Kelly et al, 2003; 
Willingham, 1999). However, theories o f imitation argue that observation o f an action 
causes that action to be primed in the observer (see section 1.3.1.1 o f Chapter 1 for 
evidence). Thus, one would expect that observation of a model’s response in the SRT 
task would produce the same type o f knowledge as that gained through physically 
responding. If this is true, then observation o f a model’s responses, in common with 
practice-based knowledge, may lead to implicit learning. Observation of screen 
stimuli however would still be expected to rely on explicit knowledge. It is interesting 
to note that all o f the experiments which have shown observational learning to rely on 
explicit knowledge have trained observers with screen stimuli, but not with a model’s 
responses. If  the above hypothesis is true, one would expect the performance of 
Group OS, and Group OS+H to differ on the recognition test. Group OS, which have 
not been trained using a model’s responses, should have no opportunity to learn 
implicitly if  action is necessary for such learning. In contrast, Group OS+H are 
trained by observing a model’s response, and if  action observation causes motor 
activation, would have the opportunity to learn implicitly. Comparison o f Group 
OS+H with Group P will enable the claim that action is necessary for implicit
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learning to be assessed. As both groups are trained on the same number o f sequence 
cycles, and both groups have access to action representations o f the sequence (directly 
for Group P and through observation o f a model’s response for Group OS+H), one 
would expect Group OS+H to show implicit learning if  Group P learn implicitly.
3.2.1 Method
The method was exactly the same as that o f Experiment 4, except as noted.
Participants. An additional forty-eight volunteers participated in Experiment 5. These 
were randomly allocated to four equal groups: Observe Screen (OS), Observe Screen 
and Hands (OS+H), Practice (P) and Control (C). Their mean age was 23 years, 15 
were male, and each was paid a small honorarium for their participation. Two 
participants who made more than 1 0 % errors during the random and test blocks were 
replaced.
Procedure. In Experiment 4 the number o f sequence cycles presented to participants 
during training (64 or 96) did not affect the magnitude o f learning. Therefore 
participants in Experiment 5 were trained with an intermediate number o f sequence 
cycles, i.e. 80. The training procedure for Group OS+H, Group OS, and Group C was 
the same as in Experiment 4. Group P were asked to respond to training blocks in the 
same manner as test blocks using the same keys and fingers. Participants in Group P 
were seated approximately 60cm in front o f the computer screen, so that their visual 
experience o f the onscreen stimuli was the same as that o f Group OS.
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Recognition Test. Following training and initial testing, participants were given a 
recognition test. The recognition test used in this experiment was the same as that 
used in Experiment 2 o f Chapter 2, but was adapted for a 12-item sequence with four 
response locations. Participants were told that they would be given sequences o f six 
asterisk locations, presented in the usual stimulus array. They were to respond to 
these stimuli as they had during familiarization and initial testing, using keys V-M, 
operated by the index and middle fingers o f each hand. After responding to the 
sequence o f six stimulus presentations, they were asked to give a rating o f how 
confident they were that the test sequence was the same as the sequence used during 
training and initial testing. As before, ratings were made on a scale from 1 to 6 , 
where 1 = certain I  have not seen the sequence before, 2 - fairly certain I  have not 
seen the sequence before, 3 - guess I  have not seen the sequence before, 4 - guess I  
have seen the sequence before, 5 - fairly certain I  have seen the sequence before, and 
6  -certain I  have seen this sequence before. Both ratings and trial-by-trial RTs were 
recorded. There were 12 test sequences in total, presented in random order. Six 'old' 
sequences were derived from the training sequence, and six 'new' sequences were 
derived from the sequence: 2-4-1-2-1-3-4-2-3-1-4-3. New test sequences were 
selected which did not occur in the training sequence.
3.2.2 Results and Discussion
Data from the familiarization stage were analysed as in Experiment 4, using 
univariate ANOVA with group (OS+H, OS, P, and C) as a between-subjects factor. 
The effect of group was not significant (F< 1), indicating that groups did not differ in
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response time to random stimuli (Group OS+H Mean = 418 SEM =17, Group OS M 
= 465 SEM = 22, Group P M = 430 SEM = 20, Group C M = 440 SEM = 21).
As in Experiment 4, sequence knowledge was calculated using a difference score 
which reflects any difference in response speed to the training and new sequences. 
These data (shown in Figure 7), were entered into a univariate ANOVA with group 
(OS+H, OS, P, and C) as a between-subjects factor. The effect o f group was 
significant ( F ^ ^  = 4,4 p = 0,009). A Helmert contrast compared control with 
experimental (OS+H, OS, and P) groups in the first instance, then practice with 
observation groups, and finally the two observation groups. This analysis revealed a 
significant difference between the control and experimental groups (p = 0 .0 0 2 ), no 
difference between the practice and observation groups, and no difference between 
the two observation groups.
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Figure 7 -  Mean RT to training and new sequenced blocks for groups that; observed screen 
stimuli and the model’s responses (Observe Screen and Hands), observed screen stimuli alone 
(Observe Screen), responded to stimuli (Practice), or completed anagram problems (Control),
during training in Experiment 5.
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Results from the initial test indicate that groups OS+H, OS, and P learned more of the 
sequence than the control group. In addition the amount of learning shown by the 
observation groups was equal in magnitude to that o f the groups which physically 
responded during training. No difference was found, as indexed by the amount of 
learning shown on the initial test, between observation o f screen stimuli alone, and 
screen stimuli and the responses of the model.
Table 3 shows mean RT and rating data from both training and new test sequences 
presented in the recognition test. Analysis of the recognition test followed the same 
format as in Experiment 2. Separate analyses were performed on the RT and rating 
data to identify sequence knowledge shown by any group on each measure. Analysis 
of the RT data was completed using ANOVA with sequence (training, new) as a 
within-subjects factor, and group (OS+H, OS, P and C) as a between-subjects factor. 
The analysis revealed a significant main effect o f sequence (F(i,44) = 34.4 p < 0.001), 
but not o f group ( F ^ )  < 1). The interaction between sequence and group was not 
reliable ( F ^ )  < 1). Simple effects analysis (warranted by Howell 1996, p. 415) 
revealed that there was a significant difference in RT to training and new sequences 
for Groups OS+H ( F ^ )  = 16.9 p < 0.001), OS (F ^^ ) = 9.8 p < 0.003), and P ( F ^ )  
= 7.9 p < 0.007). The difference in RT between training and new sequences for the 
control group was not reliable (F (1,44) = 2.9 p = 0.098).
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Group Mean Rating
Training
(SEM)
Mean Rating
New
(SEM)
M eanRT
Training
(SEM)
Mean RT
New
(SEM)
Observe 4.58 3.33 444 490
Screen (0.19) (0.31) (2 0 .2 ) (26.7)
Observe 3.86 3.46 443 504
Screen & Hands (0.18) (0.35) (1 1 .1 ) (10.9)
Practice 4.31 3.67 428 470(0.24) (0 .2 1 ) (11.9) (16.0)
Control 4.04 3.74 441 466
(0.19) (0.16) (16.0) (13.4)
Table 3. Mean (+- standard error) RT and recognition ratings given to training and new
sequences by groups that had observed screen stimuli (Observe Screen), observed screen 
stimuli and model’s responses (Observe Screen & Hands), responded to stimuli (Practice), or 
completed anagrams (Control) during training in Experiment 5.
The same ANOVA applied to the rating data revealed a significant main effect of 
sequence ( F ^ )  = 19.0 P < 0.001), but neither the main effect o f group (F<1), nor the 
sequence by group interaction (F(3,44)=2 . 0  p = 0.125) was reliable. Simple effects 
analysis demonstrated that training sequences were rated as significantly more 
familiar than new sequences by groups, OS (F(i,44)=17.6 p < 0.001), and P (F(i,44)= 4.6 
p = 0.038), but not by groups OS+H and Control (F (1,44) = 1.8 p = 0.184, and F (1,44) = 
1.0 p = 0.311, respectively).
Thus, in the recognition test Groups OS and P showed sequence knowledge as 
indexed by RT and ratings o f familiarity, indicating that their sequence knowledge 
was explicit. Group OS+H exhibited sequence knowledge on the RT measure but not 
on the rating measure, suggesting that their sequence knowledge was implicit. The 
control group did not show any sequence knowledge on either the RT or rating 
measures. It must be noted at this stage that although the results o f Group OS+H 
demonstrate implicit learning based on the standard interpretation o f this type of 
recognition test (e.g. Seger, 1997; Shanks & Johnstone, 1999), the claim rests on a
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null effect; that there is no statistically significant difference in the recognition ratings 
given to training and new sequences by Group OS+H. Such a null result does not 
justify a strong claim o f implicit learning in Group OS+H: the difference between 
ratings given to training and new sequences may become statistically significant using 
other methods o f statistical analysis and/or given greater experimental power. The 
results o f this test are still o f some use however; although Group OS+H show a 
numerically greater amount of sequence knowledge, as indexed by a difference in 
mean RT to training and new sequences, than Group OS and Group P, the level o f 
sequence knowledge revealed by recognition ratings is less for Group OS+H than 
Group OS and Group P. Thus, while not providing sufficient evidence to support a 
strong claim o f implicit learning by Group OS+H, these results do suggest that the 
sequence knowledge acquired by Group OS+H was less available for conscious use 
than that acquired by Groups OS and P.
Experiment 5 replicated and extended the results of Experiment 4 in several important 
respects. First, the observational learning of a 12-item SOC sequence shown by 
Groups OS+H and OS in Experiment 4 was also shown in Experiment 5. Second, the 
extent o f this learning was found to be comparable in magnitude to a group of 
participants who physically practised the task during the training period. Third, the 
results from the recognition test indicated that the sequence knowledge gained by the 
Observe Screen and Practice groups was explicit; but that the sequence knowledge 
gained by the Observe Screen and Hands group was less available to consciousness
i.e. the results suggested that learning may have been implicit. It was suggested that a 
sequence o f responses could be learned implicitly due to the reliance o f implicit
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learning on action, and the ability of human movement observation to produce motor 
activation. This hypothesis was tested further in Experiment 6 .
3.3 Experiment 6
The results o f Experiment 5 suggested that observational sequence learning by a 
group o f participants who observe stimulus presentation only was explicit in nature.
In contrast, results o f the recognition test implied that the sequence knowledge gained 
through the observation o f stimuli and the responses o f an expert model may have 
been implicit. There are at least two potential reasons for this contrast: observation of 
a model’s actions and observation of screen stimuli may lead to different types of 
learning, or to different amounts o f learning o f a single type.
The former explanation assumes that learning a sequence o f observed body 
movements is qualitatively different to learning a sequence o f screen stimuli. 
Evidence consistent with this assumption includes studies reporting activation of 
cortical and periphery motor neurons in response to observation o f biological, but not 
inanimate, movement stimuli (e.g. Aziz-Zadeh, Maeda, Zaidel, Mazziotta, & 
Iacoboni, 2002; Manthey, Schubotz, & von Cramon, 2003; Stevens, Fonlupt, Shifffar, 
& Decety, 1999; see Chapter 1 section 1.3.1.3 and 1.3.1.4). These data suggest that 
observation o f the model’s responses in addition to stimulus presentation may have 
resulted in different cortical processing compared to the observation o f stimulus 
presentation alone. Such a distinction between learning o f human movements and 
inanimate stimuli is consistent with the three theories o f imitation tested in this thesis.
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The second explanation, that observation o f the model’s response distracts attention 
from observation o f the screen stimuli and thus sequence knowledge does not become 
explicit, is consistent with data showing that increasing training can result in implicit 
knowledge becoming explicit (Frensch & Runger, 2003; Remillard & Clark, 2001; 
Seger, 1997). This explanation assumes that observation o f the model’s response does 
not contribute to sequence knowledge.
To distinguish between the qualitative and quantitative possibilities, Experiment 6  
presented participants with stimuli in which hand movements were the sole source of 
information (Group Observe Hands). Participants observed the model’s responses but 
were prevented from viewing the stimuli to which the model was responding. I f  the 
Observe Screen and Hands group learned implicitly in Experiment 5 as a result o f 
observing movement stimuli, then this group should also learn implicitly. The control 
group in Experiment 6 , as in Experiments 4 and 5, completed anagrams throughout 
the training period.
3.3.1 Method
Participants. An additional 24 volunteers participated in Experiment 6 . These were 
randomly allocated to two equal groups: Observe Hands (OH), and Control (C).
Their mean age was 27 years, 15 were male, and each was paid a small honorarium 
for their participation. Three participants who made more than 10% errors during the 
random and test blocks were replaced.
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Procedure. The procedure o f Experiment 6  was exactly the same as Experiment 5 
except as noted. The treatment of Group OH during training was the same as that o f 
Observe Screen and Hands in Experiment 5, except that the computer screen 
presenting stimuli to the expert model was rotated approximately 60° away from the 
participants. This meant that participants could not see stimuli being presented. They 
were asked to pay attention to the model’s hands as she completed the training blocks. 
The treatment o f the Control group was the same as in Experiment 5.
3.3.2 Results and Discussion
Data from the familiarization stage were analysed using univariate ANOVA with 
group (OH and C) as a between-subjects factor. The effect o f group was not 
significant (F(i,22> = 1.4 p = 0.245), indicating comparable RT to random stimuli 
between Group OH (M = 517 SEM =19) and Group C (M = 485 SEM = 19).
RT on test blocks to training and new sequences are shown in Figure 8 . Difference 
scores derived from RTs to the training and new sequenced blocks were entered into a 
univariate ANOVA with Group as a between-subjects factor. The difference between 
Group OH and C was significant (F(i,22) = 5.2 P = .033).
93
480
470
460 -
^  4 5 0  'UT
^  440 -
430 -
420 -
Observe Hands 
Control
410 -
400
Training Sequence New Sequence
Group
Figure 8 -  Mean RT to training and new sequenced blocks for groups that observed the 
model’s responses (Observe Hands), or completed anagram problems (Control), during
training in Experiment 6.
Data from the recognition test are shown in Table 4. Analysis of the RT data from the 
recognition test revealed significant main effects o f sequence (F(i,22) = 20.4 P <
0.001), and group (F(i>22) = 14.4 P = 0.001). The interaction between sequence and 
group was also significant ( F ^ )  = 9.4 P = .006). Simple effects analysis indicated 
that in Group OH RTs to new sequences were significantly longer than RTs to 
training sequences, and that for Group C RTs to new and training sequences did not 
differ.
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Group Mean Rating Mean Rating Mean RT M eanRT
Training New Training New
(SEM) (SEM) (SEM) (SEM)
Observe 3.86 3.46 513 571
Hands (0.18) (0.35) (26.4) (33.6)
Control 3.86 3.67 411 422(0 .2 1 ) (0 .1 2 ) (15.4) (15.1)
Table 4. Mean (+- standard error) RT and recognition ratings given to training and new 
sequences by groups that had observed a model's fingers as he responded to the training 
sequence (Observe Hands) or had completed anagram problems (Control) during training in
Experiment 6.
The same analyses applied to the recognition rating data did not show any significant 
effects in either the initial ANOVA (Sequence F(i>22) = 2.7 p = 0.115, Group, 
Sequence x Group Fs < 1), or subsequent simple effects analysis (Group OH F(i,22) = 
2 .4 p = 0.132, Group C F < 1 ) .
Although interpretation o f the recognition test rests on a null effect, and so implicit 
learning cannot be definitively claimed, this experiment demonstrated that observers 
of a model’s response can learn a 12-item SOC sequence and suggested that they may 
not have been aware o f their sequence knowledge. These results, in combination with 
the results of Experiment 5, suggest that observation o f action may lead to learning 
which is qualitatively different from that gained through observation o f inanimate 
stimuli. Furthermore, these results suggest that observation o f a movement sequence 
may support implicit learning.
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3.4 General Discussion
Experiment 4 demonstrated that both observers o f stimuli, and observers o f stimuli 
plus the responses o f an expert model, could learn a 12-item SOC sequence in an SRT 
task. Sequence knowledge gained by these groups through observational training was 
greater than that o f untrained controls. Experiment 5 replicated and extended this 
result by confirming that participants who receive observational training learn more 
than untrained participants, and that observers learn as much as participants who 
physically respond to stimuli during training. Interestingly, the results o f the 
recognition test indicated that sequence knowledge gained by the Observe Screen and 
Practice groups was explicit, but knowledge gained by the Observe Screen and Hands 
group may have been implicit in nature. Experiment 6  showed that observers o f a 
model’s response without screen stimuli were able to learn a 1 2 -item SOC sequence. 
In addition, results of the recognition test suggested that participants were unaware of 
sequence knowledge they had gained through training.
The finding that a 12-item SOC sequence can be learned through observation, and that 
the magnitude o f such learning is comparable to physical practice, conflicts with the 
results o f Kelly and Burton (2001). Kelly and Burton found no evidence o f 
observational learning in comparison with practice participants. However, the present 
findings support those o f Seger (1997) and Heyes and Foster (2002) who found 
equivalent learning by observation and physical practice using 1 0  and 6  -item 
sequences, respectively.
Possible reasons for the contrast between the results of Kelly and Burton (2001) and 
those obtained in these experiments may lie in the details o f what participants
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observed in the two studies. In the first o f Kelly and Burton’s experiments, observers 
watched screen stimuli and the responses o f a novice responder. This group can be 
compared with Group Observe Screen and Hands in the present experiments, in which 
participants also had the opportunity to observe screen stimuli and responses. The 
most apparent difference between the two sets o f experiments is the level o f expertise 
o f the model. The present experiments used an expert model who responded at a 
constant rate and who made very few errors. In contrast, responses observed in Kelly 
and Burton’s first experiment were made by a novice participant, who would have 
presumably made more errors, and produced less fluid movements than an expert 
model. Response errors would mean that the sequence is disrupted and thus would 
become probabilistic; instead o f the stimuli appearing according to the sequence 
100% o f the time, the probability o f a sequential response would be lower. Research 
which has investigated the effect o f training on probabilistic sequences has suggested 
that learning proceeds at a slower rate with small amounts o f sequence uncertainty, 
and does not occur at all with increased rates o f uncertainty (Schvaneveldt & Gomez, 
1998).
In the second o f Kelly and Burton’s (2001) experiments, participants observed 
stimulus presentation only and thus were comparable to the Observe Screen group in 
the present experiments. Kelly and Burton did not find any evidence o f observational 
learning in comparison with participants who responded during training, but Observe 
Screen participants in the present experiments showed comparable learning to practice 
participants. A potential reason for this difference in results is that Kelly and Burton’s 
participants observed a non-spatial sequence while a spatial sequence was observed in 
the present experiments. It is possible that observational learning o f screen stimuli is
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more likely to occur when spatial stimuli are used. Evidence consistent with this 
hypothesis is that studies reporting observational sequence learning o f screen stimuli 
in the SRT task have all used a spatial sequence (e.g. Howard et al, 1992; Kelly et al, 
2003; Seger, 1997; Willingham, 1999). Also, these experiments find that observers 
learn the sequence explicitly (although Seger, 1997 reports implicit learning shown by 
a subset o f observer participants), and Hikosaka et al (2002) have argued that explicit 
learning in sequence tasks is mediated by spatial knowledge. Thus it is plausible that 
Kelly and Burton (2001, exp. 2) failed to find observational learning due to the use o f 
a non-spatial sequence.
The suggestion that observational learning may have been implicit is perhaps the most 
significant o f these experiments, both for the preceding literature and for theories of 
imitation. It has been argued that observational learning must be explicit; that action is 
necessary in order to learn implicitly (Kelly & Burton, 2001). Experiments supporting 
this claim include Kelly et al (2003), Howard, Mutter, and Howard (1992), 
Willingham (1999) and Berry (1991). These experiments have all demonstrated the 
reliance o f observational learning on explicit knowledge. Results o f the Observe 
Screen group in the present experiments support this view: The Observe Screen group 
learned the sequence by observation and showed awareness o f this knowledge on the 
recognition test. However, results o f the group which observed screen stimuli and a 
model’s responses (Observe Screen and Hands), and the group which only observed 
the model’s responses (Observe Hands) indicate that participants in these groups may 
have learned implicitly. These groups both learned through observation but did not 
reliably rate training sequences as more familiar than new sequences.
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The hypothesised difference in awareness between the Observe Screen group and the 
groups that observed a model’s response is striking, because all were exposed to the 
same amount o f training on the same sequence. Two possible reasons for the different 
levels o f awareness after observing responses and stimuli were proposed. The first 
was that observation o f a model’s response produces a different kind o f learning and 
one o f the features o f this type of learning is that it can be implicit. The second 
suggests that learning goes through a transition from being implicit to explicit with 
increasing sequence experience. Observation o f a model’s response as well as screen 
stimuli may lead to distracted attention and reduce the amount o f sequence experience 
compared to screen stimuli alone.
Experiment 6  was a first step in refuting the second explanation. Observed responses 
were the sole source o f sequence information in Experiment 6 , and yet results suggest 
observers may still have learned the sequence implicitly. However, the results of 
Experiment 6  do not rule out an explanation based on decreased sequence knowledge. 
They show that viewing the model’s fingers is not merely a source o f distraction; that 
observed finger movements are instead a source o f sequence knowledge. However, it 
is still possible that observing finger movements provides less sequence information 
than observing screen stimuli, and therefore that the groups that observed finger 
movements failed to provide evidence o f explicit knowledge because they had less 
information o f the same kind as that o f the Observe Screen group.
The finding that the Observe Screen and Observe Screen and Hands groups showed 
no difference in the magnitude of sequence knowledge upon initial testing in 
Experiments 4 and 5 argues against an explanation based on the amount o f sequence
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knowledge. This finding suggests that sequence knowledge was equal between the 
groups. Although it is possible that the rating measure on the recognition test detected 
a difference in sequence knowledge which the RT measure did not, this is unlikely 
due to the categorical 6 -point nature of the rating scale compared to the continuous 
RT measure. An explanation resting on differential amounts o f sequence knowledge 
between the groups would still run counter to Kelly and Burton’s (2001) claim that 
implicit observational learning cannot occur, as observational learning would have to 
be implicit in the early stages o f training.
The alternative explanation, that observation o f a model’s response produces a 
different type o f learning, has support from preceding experiments and can be 
incorporated into Kelly and Burton’s hypothesis about the necessity of action for 
implicit learning. Evidence suggesting motor activation in response to action 
observation has been provided by neurological and neurophysiological experiments 
showing action observation leads to the activation o f cortical and peripheral motor 
neurons (e.g. Aziz-Zadeh et al., 2002; Buccino et al., 2001; Hari et al., 1998). 
Behavioural evidence for this process has been provided by experiments 
demonstrating action priming in response to action observation including; Brass et al 
(2000,2001), Sturmer et al (2000), Heyes and Foster (2002), and the experiments in 
Chapter 2.
These experiments suggest that learning may be qualitatively different when 
responses are observed as well as, or instead of, screen stimuli. Observers of 
responses may encode their sequence knowledge in a motoric fashion, as if  they had 
responded during training. Observers who learn only screen stimuli have no
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opportunity to engage in motor learning (as they neither respond, nor observe 
responses during training) and thus are unlikely to encode their sequence knowledge 
as motor representations.
This explanation is consistent with a recent theory o f motor skill learning (Hikosaka, 
Nakamura, Sakai, & Nakahara, 2002) which describes the properties o f two parallel 
learning processes. The first o f these is concerned with the learning o f motor 
information, information learned is effector-dependent (information learned with one 
effector cannot be transferred to another), and implicit (see also Russeler and Rosier, 
2000). The second process is concerned with learning spatial information which is 
explicitly represented. Thus observers o f a model’s responses may learn motor 
representations which are implicit, but observers o f screen stimuli may learn a spatial 
sequence which is represented explicitly. It is significant that observers in all o f the 
studies which have shown that observational learning relies on explicit knowledge 
have observed screen stimuli only (Howard, Mutter and Howard, 1992; Willingham, 
1999; and Kelly et al, 2003). Furthermore, if  observational learning of screen stimuli 
relies on spatial representations, this would explain why stimulus-observation 
participants in Kelly and Burton (2001) did not learn in a non-spatial task. This 
explanation may not be complete however. Participants who responded to stimuli in 
Experiment 5 did not learn implicitly, even though they would be the group expected 
to learn motor information. Previous studies have however, reported implicit learning 
in participants who respond to stimuli during training (e.g. Exner et al., 2002; Kelly & 
Burton, 2001; Reber & Squire, 1998), and results o f Chapter 2 show that motor 
knowledge is not always implicit.
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If  the argument is accepted that observers of a model’s response learned implicitly as 
they received some motor knowledge, then Kelly and Burton’s (2001) claim that 
implicit observational learning is not possible must be modified. Implicit 
observational learning was ruled out due to a belief that action was necessary in order 
to learn implicitly. The results o f this study suggest that motor representations may be 
necessary to learn implicitly, but that these can be gained from observation o f 
movements. Thus, in combination with the results o f Kelly and Burton (2001), the 
results o f Experiments 4 - 6  suggest that implicit observational learning o f a 
movement sequence may be possible, but implicit observational learning o f a 
sequence o f static, inanimate stimuli is not.
The implications o f these results for theories o f imitation are interesting. The AIM 
model o f imitation argues that imitation is an effortful process which involves 
inference and an active comparison between current and desired body states. This 
model therefore implies that imitation o f learned and novel behaviour will not be 
implicit. The present experiments investigated how aware participants were of 
information learned through imitation. The only groups in which imitative learning 
could have been demonstrated were the Observe Screen and Hands, and Observe 
Hands groups as these were the only groups trained through observation of a model’s 
responses. The results showed that it was possible to learn a 1 2 -item SOC sequence 
through observation o f responses alone, and in combination with screen stimuli. The 
finding that these groups learned the sequence, but may have had no conscious 
awareness o f what they had learned suggests that imitation was not accomplished 
according to the AIM model. In contrast, both the ASL and Ideomotor theories of
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imitation posit that imitation can occur without awareness and are therefore consistent 
with the results o f the present experiments.
In summary, Experiments 4 - 6  investigated the amount and nature o f any sequence 
knowledge gained through observation in an SRT task. Learning due to observation of 
screen stimuli, screen stimuli and responses, and responses alone was compared to 
that due to physically responding to stimuli and a control group who completed 
anagram problems. Results revealed that all three observation groups could learn the 
sequence, and that observational learning was o f equal magnitude to that gained 
through physical practice. Tests o f awareness revealed that participants who 
responded to stimuli during training and those who observed screen stimuli were 
aware o f the sequence knowledge they had gained. In contrast, results suggested that 
those participants who had observed either responses alone, or responses and screen 
stimuli, were unaware o f their sequence knowledge, i.e. they had learned implicitly.
If, as suggested by the present results, participants learned the sequence implicitly by 
observing a model’s response, then implicit learning through imitation is possible. 
Implicit imitation is not consistent with the AIM model o f imitation described by 
Meltzoff and Moore (1977, 1994,1997) but is consistent with both the ASL (Heyes, 
2001; Heyes & Ray, 2000) and Ideomotor (Prinz, 1997, 2002) theories o f imitation.
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Chapter Four: The Role of Experience in Imitation
Theories o f imitation suggest two main routes to imitative ability. AIM argues that an 
innate cognitive module is responsible for the ability to imitate, while ASL and 
Ideomotor theories attribute imitative ability to learned associations. ASL posits that 
these associations are between perceptual and motor representations. Ideomotor 
theory, in contrast, suggests associations are formed between actions and their effects 
(for further details see Section 1.2 o f Chapter 1).
Experiments in this chapter investigated whether imitation is innate or experience- 
dependent by examining the impact o f counter-imitative training on a movement 
compatibility effect. A movement compatibility effect is the name given to the finding 
that responses to movement stimuli are faster when stimulus and response movements 
match, than when they do not (see Section 1.3.1.1 o f Chapter 1). It has recently been 
appreciated that the movement compatibility effect is a result o f the imitation system 
(Brass, Bekkering & Prinz, 2001; Chapter 1; Prinz, 1997). Observation o f an action 
primes the corresponding action in the observer; when the primed and response 
movements match, then responses are fast. However, when the primed and response 
movements do not match, then the primed response must be inhibited before the 
response movement can be performed.
Experiment 7 demonstrated a movement compatibility effect which was not 
confounded with spatial compatibility. Experiment 8  studied the effect o f counter- 
imitative training on this movement compatibility effect. Counter-imitative training 
involves repeatedly pairing observation o f a movement with the execution o f an
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incompatible movement. I f  imitation is achieved through a dedicated, innate, 
cognitive module, then one might expect modest amounts o f counter-imitative 
training to have little effect on the movement compatibility effect. Conversely, if  
imitation is instead based on associative mechanisms in which experience is crucial, 
then the movement compatibility effect should be reduced or even reversed.
In summary. Movement compatibility effects are thought to rely on mechanisms used 
to produce imitative movements. In imitation, and in the movement compatibility 
effect, motor representations o f perceived actions are activated. The aim o f the 
experiments reported here is to discover whether movement compatibility effects can 
be modified through incompatible training. The susceptibility o f the movement 
compatibility effect, and by association imitation itself, is of theoretical importance in 
the imitation literature.
4.1 Experiment 7
An example o f an experiment which demonstrates a movement compatibility effect is 
that o f Sturmer, Aschersleben and Prinz (2000). In this experiment a choice RT task 
meant that participants either opened or closed their hand in response to either hand 
opening or hand closing stimuli. Response selection (hand opening or closing) did not 
depend on which stimulus movement was observed, but instead on the colour o f the 
movement stimulus. Sturmer et al found that responses were faster on compatible 
trials (where stimulus and response movements matched), than on incompatible trials 
(where stimulus and response movements were different).
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Experiment 7 investigated whether a movement compatibility effect could be found 
using a procedure similar to that o f Sturmer et al (2000). In a simple RT task, one of 
two response movements (either hand opening or hand closing) was performed in a 
blocked design. On each trial, the imperative stimulus was either an opening or 
closing hand, presented in random order on a computer screen. Thus, on every trial, 
stimulus and response movements were either the same, (compatible trials), or 
different, (incompatible trials). A simple RT task was used in order to increase the 
chances that the stimulus movement would be processed as a movement (rather than 
merely a change of colour), and thus increase the chances of a movement 
compatibility effect being found.
In order to preclude any confound of movement compatibility with simple spatial 
compatibility effects, stimulus and response movements were orthogonal. Stimulus 
movements were demonstrated with the arm in a vertical position (see Figures 9a and 
9b). Response movements were perpendicular to stimulus movements about the 
vertical plane (across the body, see Figure 10). Orthogonal direction of stimulus and 
response movements is a departure from the procedure used by Sturmer et al (2000), 
who confounded spatial cues with movement type.
Figure 9a -  Neutral (foreground), and Figure 9b -  Neutral (background) and
Open movement end point (background) Close movement end point (foreground)
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C)
Figure 10 -  Position o f the hand during stimulus (inset) and response movements. During 
stimulus movements the hand was arranged along the vertical axis (a), but along the 
horizontal axis (b) when participants were responding. The transverse horizontal axis (c) is
also shown.
In an effort to reduce anticipation errors, the strategy of Brass, Bekkering and Prinz 
(2001) was adopted. Brass et al demonstrated movement compatibility effects in 
simple RT tasks and reduced anticipation errors by introduced a variable delay 
(800ms, 1600ms, or 2400ms) between the onset of the warning signal, and the onset 
of the imperative stimulus.
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In line with previous reports of movement compatibility effects (e.g. Brass et al.,
2001; Brass et al., 2000; Iacoboni et al., 2001; Iacoboni et al., 1999; Sturmer et al., 
2 0 0 0 ), it was expected that responding would be faster on compatible than on 
incompatible trials.
4.1.1 Method
Participants. Ten staff and students at UCL participated in the experiment. Their 
mean age was 33.6 years, two were male, all were right-handed, and each was paid a 
small honorarium for their participation. They all gave their informed consent to 
participate in the study.
Stimuli & Apparatus. Stimulus presentation was controlled by an IBM-compatible 
laptop (Dell Latitude C840) attached to a 38cm colour TFT display with a resolution 
o f 1600 x 1200 pixels. Two hands were each digitally recorded performing the two 
stimulus movements (opening and closing), to provide two tokens o f each stimulus 
movement type. Two movement tokens were used to increase the generality o f results. 
The resulting videos were stored as AVI video files (1440 x 960 pixels) and played in 
colour on a black background (see Figure 9a, and 9b). The clips were edited so that 
opening and closing movements both started from a common neutral position, and the 
duration o f each movement was 480ms. The common neutral frame for each model 
was used as a static warning signal for stimulus movement onset. All four video clips 
(two tokens o f hand opening and two o f hand closing), were played full screen. For 
hand closing, the final posture occupied approximately 1 0 ° o f visual angle
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horizontally, and 13° vertically. For hand opening, the final posture occupied 
approximately 16° horizontally and 23° vertically. Viewing distance was 
approximately 60cm and the hands appeared slightly larger than life-size.
A second IBM-compatible laptop recorded two signals. One signal was the amplified 
EMG signal from the first dorsal interosseus muscle (FDI) and the second was a 
signal from the stimulus presentation program which marked the start and end o f the 
stimulus movement. Comparison o f these two signals allowed RT to the movement 
stimulus to be calculated, as both stimulus and response movement onsets were 
recorded.
Electromyographic Recording and RT Measurement. The movement o f the right 
index finger, for both close and open responses, was measured by recording the 
electromyogram (EMG) from the first dorsal interosseus muscle of the right hand. 
Disposable Ag/AgCl surface electrodes (Arbo Inc., Stratford, CT, USA) were used. 
The right forearm o f the participant (from elbow to wrist) was supported by an arm­
rest. The EMG signals were amplified, high-pass filtered at 20 Hz, mains-hum filtered 
at 50 Hz and digitised at 2.5 kHz. The signals were recorded on a computer for later 
analysis. The EMG signal was rectified and smoothed using a dual-pass Butterworth 
filter, with a cut-off frequency o f 50 Hz.
An algorithm was used to detect EMG onset for each trial. The algorithm used the 
standard deviation o f the EMG signal during a baseline period o f 95 ms before 
movement stimulus onset, and therefore prior to any EMG response, to estimate noise 
in the EMG signal. A criterion o f 2.75 times this noise level was used to define
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gesture onset. A window o f 20ms was moved progressively over the raw EMG data in 
lm s steps. When the standard deviation o f the 20ms window, and the 20ms epoch 
occurring after the end o f the window, both reached the criterion level, the beginning 
o f the 20ms window was used as gesture onset time. This marked the end of the RT 
interval. Whether this criterion correctly defined gesture onset was verified by sight 
for every trial performed by every participant.
Participants were told which response movement to perform before each practice and 
test block. They were asked to perform each movement rapidly with a sudden 
movement onset, so that a clearly defined electromyographic signature signalling 
response movement onset would be produced. Visual feedback o f the EMG signal 
produced by their movement was given to participants before practice blocks until 
they consistently produced movements which led to clearly defined muscle activity 
onset as illustrated by the EMG waveform. After completing one practice and two test 
blocks making one response movement, the process of EMG training was repeated for 
the alternative response movement. Visual feedback o f the EMG waveform produced 
by participant’s activity was not provided during practice and test blocks.
Procedure. Participants were instructed to rest their right forearm on an arm-rest so 
that their hand was free to move. The arm was arranged horizontally (see Figure 10). 
Each trial began with the presentation o f a static hand in the neutral starting position. 
The hand performed one o f two stimulus movements, closing or opening, after one of 
three time delays (800ms, 1600ms, or 2400ms). Stimulus movement onset defined the 
start o f RT measurement. A closing movement o f the hand resulted in a fist being 
formed, while an open response ended with the fingers fully extended and spread
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apart (see Figure 9). The neutral resting posture, adopted by the participant between 
trials, was matched to the neutral starting posture shown on the movement stimuli 
videos, i.e. the hand was in a position halfway between the closed and open end- 
postures. Each movement started from the neutral resting position and the pre­
instructed movement was executed as soon as stimulus movement was detected. 
Participants were instructed not to move on catch trials (see below). After executing 
the response, the hand was returned to the neutral starting position. An experimenter, 
standing behind the participant, verified that the correct response was made and the 
hand was returned to the neutral starting position. At the end o f each trial a blank 
screen was presented for one second. Thus, each trial consisted o f the onset o f the 
warning signal (static hand), a delay o f 800ms, 1600ms, or 2400ms before onset of 
stimulus movement (duration 480ms). A blank screen was then presented for 1000ms 
(ITI) before the next trial began.
Participants completed a total of two practice blocks and four test blocks. Each test 
block was made up o f 72 trials. O f these, 12 were catch trials in which the warning 
stimulus was not followed by the imperative stimulus, i.e. the static neutral hand 
position remained on screen without moving for 2880ms. The 60 remaining trials in 
each test block required the participant to make the pre-specified response to the onset 
o f stimulus movement. These trials contained ten repetitions o f each unique 
combination o f stimulus movement (open or close) and stimulus onset asynchrony 
(SOA) factors. Movement token was counterbalanced across test blocks. Trials were 
presented in a random order. Test blocks were ordered so that participants completed 
two blocks o f one response movement, either opening or closing, and then two blocks 
o f the other. Although participants were asked if  they would like to rest between test
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blocks, none o f them wished to do so. Order o f test blocks (either open response 
followed by close response or vice versa) was counterbalanced across participants. 
One practice block preceded each set o f two test blocks. Practice blocks were 12 trials 
long and were composed o f two trials o f each unique combination o f the stimulus 
movement and SOA factors, with one o f these unique combinations being randomly 
re-allocated as a catch trial.
4.1.2 Results and Discussion
RTs over 1000ms were excluded from the analysis. Movement errors (producing the 
wrong response or an absence o f movement) did not occur in test blocks. On every 
trial, stimulus and response movements were either the same (compatible trials), or 
were different (incompatible trials). Thus, RT data were analysed using analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) with response (open, close), trial type (compatible, incompatible), 
Block (Block 1, trials 1-72, or Block 2, trials 73-144), and SOA (800ms, 1600ms, 
2400ms) as within-subjects factors. In all analyses, all significant effects are reported 
(alpha = 0.05).
Figure 11 shows average (and SEM) RT on compatible and incompatible trials at each 
o f the three levels o f SOA. There was a significant main effect o f trial type (F(i,9) = 
23.7 p = 0.001), and a significant main effect o f SOA (F2,i8) = 29.2 p < 0.001). On 
average, responding was 19ms faster on compatible trials (396ms SEM = 24) than on 
incompatible trials (415ms SEM = 27). At the two longest SOAs responding was 
faster than at the shortest SOA (435ms SEM = 23 at 800ms, 388ms SEM = 28 at 
1600ms, and 394ms SEM = 27 at 2400ms). Although the compatibility effect was
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numerically greater with an 800ms SOA, than a 1600ms or 2400ms SOA, the 
interaction between trial type and SOA was not significant (F2,i8) = 1.5 p = 0.249).
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Figure 11 -  Mean RT on compatible and incompatible trials at each level o f SOA in 
Experiment 7. Outlined columns represent compatible trials and blocked columns represent 
incompatible trials. Vertical bars indicate SEM.
Experiments which have examined the relationship between response speed and the 
movement compatibility effect show a positive correlation between the two measures
i.e. the movement compatibility effect increases as RT increases (Brass et al, 2001; 
Sturmer et al, 2000). To find out whether the magnitude of the compatibility effect 
varied with response speed in this experiment, the distribution of each participant’s 
compatible and incompatible RTs was separately divided into three bins (following 
Ratcliff, 1979). Compatible and incompatible trials could then be compared for slow, 
medium and fast responses. Mean RT on compatible and incompatible trials at each 
bin is presented in Figure 12. ANOVA with bin (fast, medium and slow responses)
□  Compatible Trials 
■  Incompatible Trials
800 1600 2400
SOA
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and trial type (compatible, incompatible) as within-subjects factors revealed the 
following results: The main effect of trial type was significant (F ^ )  =15.6, p = 
0.003), indicating that RT on compatible trials was faster than on incompatible trials. 
Trivially, the main effect of bin was also significant (F^.is)= 45.4, p< 0.001). The 
interaction between trial type and bin was not reliable (F(2,i8) < 1).
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Figure 12 - Mean RT on compatible and incompatible trials at fast, medium and slow  
response bins in Experiment 7. Outlined columns represent compatible trials and blocked 
columns represent incompatible trials. Vertical bars indicate SEM.
Experiment 7 demonstrated a movement compatibility effect with hand open/close 
movements under two novel conditions: First, in a simple RT task, and second, when 
stimulus and response movements are performed along orthogonal dimensions. 
Orthogonal stimulus and response movements preclude an explanation of the 
movement compatibility effect in terms of simple spatial compatibility. The present 
finding demonstrates that observing a specific movement (in this case opening or
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closing o f a hand), facilitates the performance of the observed movement. Thus it can 
be concluded, following previous researchers (e.g. Brass et al., 2001; Brass et al., 
2000; Sturmer et al., 2000), that the movement compatibility effect indicates that 
perception o f an action activates the motor representation o f the perceived action in 
the perceiver. As the ability to activate the motor representation o f a perceived action 
is a key feature o f movement imitation, it is argued that the movement compatibility 
effect and imitation are products o f the same functional mechanism.
4.2 Experiment 8
Experiment 8  investigated the effect o f incompatible training on the movement 
compatibility effect. To my knowledge there are no previous studies which have 
investigated the effect o f counter-imitative training on movement compatibility 
effects. However, related experiments have been performed in the field o f spatial 
compatibility. Both spatial and movement compatibility effects are species of 
stimulus-response compatibility (SRC). SRC research investigates how characteristics 
o f stimulus and response interact to affect performance. It has been argued that 
experiments on spatial compatibility are relevant to studies o f imitation, and in 
particular to movement compatibility, as both are examples o f SRC effects (Brass et 
al., 2001). In both cases perceptual input facilitates or inhibits the performance o f a 
motor response.
Tagliabue, Zorzi, Umilta, and Bassignani (2000) attempted to change a standard 
spatial compatibility effect through incompatible training. Participants in an 
incompatible training group responded in a choice RT task in a spatially non-
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corresponding manner i.e. a stimulus to the right o f fixation was responded to with the 
left hand, and a stimulus to the left o f fixation was responded to with the right hand. 
Participants then completed a Simon task in which they were instructed to respond to 
an outlined square with a right hand keypress, and a blocked square with a left hand 
keypress. The imperative stimuli appeared either to the left or the right side of 
fixation. It is typically found that spatially compatible responses are faster than 
incompatible in a Simon task, even though response selection is based on a non- 
spatial attribute (the ‘Simon Effect’). However, in this experiment, no Simon effect 
was found when spatially incompatible training was completed five minutes or 24 
hours prior to training (see also Angrilli, Zorzi, Tagliabue, Stegagno, & Umilta, 2001; 
Tagliabue, Zorzi, & Umilta, 2002).
The experiments o f Tagliabue and her colleagues provide good evidence that spatial 
compatibility effects can be eliminated or reversed through incompatible training. 
Experiment 8  utilised a similar design to these experiments. Participants completed 
the same test phase as those in Experiment 7. Testing was preceded by one of two 
types o f training performed 24hrs prior to testing. Tagliabue et al (2000, 2001, 2002) 
have demonstrated that spatial compatibility effects can be negated with such a delay 
between training and test, and the delay may serve to lessen any confusion due to the 
difference in training and test task instructions.
H alf o f the participants received compatible training: they were required to execute 
response movements which matched stimuli movements presented on a computer 
screen. The remaining participants received incompatible training: they were 
instructed to respond to hand opening by closing their hand and to hand closing by
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opening their hand. The amount o f training (six blocks o f 72 trials each) is towards 
the lower end o f a scale defined by the lowest and highest amounts o f training in 
which elimination or reduction of the spatial compatibility effect has been reported 
(1800 trials - Proctor & Lu, 1999; 72 trials - Tagliabue et al., 2000).
If  imitation is governed by an innate, hard-wired cognitive module (as in AIM), one 
would not expect such relatively small amounts of incompatible training to have an 
effect on the movement compatibility effect. However, if  imitation is a product o f 
learning (as suggested by ASL and Ideomotor theories), then the movement 
compatibility effect should disappear, or be reversed, after incompatible training.
4.2.1 Method
Participants. Twenty students at UCL participated in this experiment. Their mean 
age was 23.25 years, eight were male, all were right-handed, and each was paid a 
small honorarium for their participation. Participants gave their informed consent to 
participate in the study, and were randomly allocated to one o f two groups: 
Compatible Training, or Incompatible Training.
Stimuli and Apparatus. These were the same as used in Experiment 7.
Procedure. The test procedure in Experiment 8  was exactly the same as that o f 
Experiment 7. Testing took place approximately 24hrs after training. Stimuli, 
response movements, and methods of RT measurement in training blocks were the 
same as in test blocks o f Experiments 7 and 8 . Training consisted o f six blocks o f 72
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trials each. Training blocks followed the same format as test blocks, except that the 
delay between the appearance o f the warning signal (static hand) and the imperative 
signal (start o f hand movement) remained constant at one second. Catch trials were 
not included in training blocks and stimulus movement presentation was randomly 
determined on each trial. A choice RT procedure was used to train participants.
Group Compatible Training (CT) was asked to respond with hand opening to opening 
o f the stimulus hand, and with hand closure to closing of the stimulus hand. Group 
Incompatible Training (IT) was asked to respond by closing their hand when the 
stimulus hand opened and by opening their hand when the stimulus hand closed. In 
order to encourage accurate performance, the number o f movement errors (both 
absent and incorrect responses) made by the participant was displayed after each 
training block. Participants were informed that if  they reduced the numbers o f errors 
they made in the next block (or maintained performance if  error-free), they would 
receive a small financial reward. Participants were not made aware o f the existence of 
this incentive scheme until after they had completed the first block.
A practice block was completed before training blocks. The practice block was 
structurally the same in every respect as that in Experiment 7 (with constant SOA), 
but responses were governed by group membership as indicated above.
4.2.2 Results and Discussion
Training. RTs over 1000ms were excluded from the analysis. Movement errors (as 
defined above) occurred in less than 0 .1 % of trials and therefore these data will not be
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reported further. A mean RT was calculated for each participant for each training 
block.
Mean RTs for both groups in each training block are presented in Figure 13. Training 
data were analysed using ANOVA with block (1-6), as a within-subjects factor and 
group (CT or IT) as a between-subjects factor. Mauchly’s Test indicated that the data 
significantly violated the assumption of sphericity (W(i4)= 0.051 p < 0 .0 0 1 ), and 
therefore ANOVA values were corrected using the Greenhouse-Geisser method. 
Significant main effects o f training block (F(5)90)= 16.45 p < 0.001), and group were 
found (F(i,i8)= 22.49 p < 0.001). The interaction between training block and group 
was also significant (F(5,90)= 3.15 p = 0.045). Between the first and the sixth block o f 
training, RT decreased by 105ms (SEM 25.7) in group IT, and by 58ms (SEM 10.9) 
in group CT.
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Figure 13 -  Mean RT for each training block in Experiment 8. Squares represent Group 
Compatible Training (CT) and triangles represent Group Incompatible Training (IT).
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Test. No movement errors were made in any test block by any participant. Mean (and 
SEM) RT for both groups on compatible and incompatible trials are shown below in 
Figure 14. RT data were analysed using ANOVA with response (open, close), trial 
type (compatible, incompatible), Block (1 or 2), and SOA (800ms, 1600ms, 2400ms) 
as within-subjects factors, and group (CT or IT) as a between-subjects factor. The 
analysis revealed a significant main effect o f trial type (F^ig) = 23.1 p < 0.001), and a 
significant main effect o f SOA (F(2,36) = 26.4 p < 0.001). On average, compatible 
movements were executed 21ms faster than incompatible movements, and responses 
following the two longest SOAs were executed faster than those made after the 
shortest SOA (RT 401ms at 800ms SOA, 368ms at 1600ms SOA, and 375ms at 
2400ms SOA). The interaction o f primary interest, between group and trial type, was 
also significant, (F(i,ig) = 8.4 p = 0.01). Group IT showed a much smaller 
compatibility effect (9ms) than group CT (34ms). Simple effects analysis revealed 
that the difference in RT between compatible and incompatible trials was significant 
for group CT (F^.ig) = 29.7 p < 0.001), but not for group IT (F(i,ig) = 1.8 p = 0.194). 
Thus the group which received compatible training showed a movement compatibility 
effect, while the group which received incompatible training did not.
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Figure 14 -  Mean RT on compatible and incompatible trials in Experiment 8. Data from both 
Group Compatible Training (CT) and Group Incompatible Training (IT) are displayed. 
Outlined columns represent compatible trials and blocked columns represent incompatible
trials. Vertical bars indicate SEM.
To find out whether the magnitude of the compatibility effect varied with response 
speed, a bin analysis was performed on these data as in Experiment 7. Mean RT to 
compatible and incompatible trials for group CT and IT at each bin are presented in 
Figure 15. These data were analysed using ANOVA with trial type (compatible, 
incompatible), and bin (slow, medium, fast) as within-subjects factors, and group (CT 
or IT), as the between-subjects factor. The analysis revealed significant main effects 
of trial type (F(i>i8)= 16.2 p = 0.001) and bin (F(2,36) = 307.7 p < 0.001). Significant 
interactions were also found between the trial type and group factors (F^ig) = 5.0 p = 
0.04), and between the trial type and bin factors (F(2,36) = 6.1 p = 0.014). However, the 
three-way interaction between group, trial type, and bin was not reliable (F(2,36) < 1)- 
The trial type x bin interaction reflects the fact that the movement compatibility effect 
increased with RT. Thus, in the fastest bin, responding was only 4.4ms faster in
□  Com patible Trials ■  Incompatible Trials
Compatible T raining Incompatible T raining
121
compatible than in incompatible trials, and in the medium bin this difference was 
6ms, but in the slowest bin the difference was 17ms. Although it increased with RT, 
simple effects analysis revealed that the compatibility effect was significant at each 
bin (slow F(i,i8) = 12.7 p = 0.002, medium F(i,ig) = 19.0 p < 0.001, fast F(i,ig) = 12.7 p 
=  0 .002).
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Figure 15 -  Mean RT on compatible and incompatible trials at fast, medium and slow 
response bins in Experiment 8. Data from both Group Compatible Training (CT) and Group 
Incompatible Training (IT) are displayed. Outlined columns represent compatible trials and 
blocked columns represent incompatible trials. Vertical bars indicate SEM.
Thus, performance on a task which is sensitive to movement compatibility 
(Experiment 7) was found in Experiment 8 to vary with the type of training received 
approximately 24hrs prior to testing. The difference in response speed between 
compatible and incompatible trials was significantly reduced for the group which had 
received incompatible training. In this group, RTs on compatible trials were not 
significantly faster than on incompatible trials. This experiment demonstrates that the
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movement compatibility effect observed in Experiment 7 is susceptible to training of 
incompatible responses. Bin analysis revealed that the movement compatibility effect 
is present at every bin, but increases as RT increases, and that this effect does not vary 
according to the type o f preceding training.
4.3 General Discussion
Using hand opening and closing movements on orthogonal dimensions o f stimulus 
and response movements, Experiment 7 compared RT on trials in which stimulus and 
response movements were compatible, to trials where they were incompatible. 
Responding was faster on compatible trials than on incompatible trials, i.e. a 
movement compatibility effect was found. Experiment 8  investigated the effect of 
compatible and incompatible training on this movement compatibility effect. Training 
involved participants producing a response movement which matched (Group CT), or 
did not match (Group IT), the stimulus movement. The results indicated that Group IT 
learned more than CT during training. Test performance revealed that participants 
who received compatible training showed the movement compatibility effect, while 
participants who had received incompatible training did not.
Following previous researchers (e.g. Brass et al., 2001; Brass et al., 2000; Stunner et 
al., 2000) the movement compatibility effect demonstrated in Experiment 7 is 
interpreted as showing that perception o f an action activates the motor representation 
o f that action. When stimulus and response movements match, execution o f response 
is facilitated. When the two movements do not match, the incorrect matching response 
must be inhibited before the correct response can be performed. Neutral stimuli were
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not presented to participants to establish a baseline from which deviation due to 
compatible and incompatible trials could be measured. Therefore the results o f this 
experiment do not indicate whether compatible responses facilitated, or incompatible 
movements retarded, response speed.
The movement compatibility effect was found even though stimulus and response 
movements were made on orthogonal dimensions. This feature o f the experimental 
design was intended to rule out an explanation o f the movement compatibility effect 
based on simple spatial compatibility. However, there is some evidence that higher- 
order spatial compatibility effects can be found when characteristics o f the response 
or stimulus set encourage spatial encoding in non-veridical terms (Hommel & Lippa, 
1995; Lippa, 1996; Prinz, 1997). For example, Hommel and Lippa (1995) displayed 
stimuli that were superimposed on the eyes o f a human face to which left or right 
hand responses were made. Spatial compatibility effects were observed even when the 
face was rotated by 90° such that the stimuli appeared above or below fixation. The 
visual context produced spatial coding o f the stimuli as left and right, even though the 
stimuli did not actually vary on the horizontal dimension.
Two factors suggest that the compatibility effects observed in the present experiments 
were not due to higher-order spatial compatibility. First, unlike faces, hands do not 
have a canonical orientation (see Valentine, 1988 for a review) and so are not likely to 
be mentally rotated. Second, research on orthogonal spatial compatibility suggests 
that compatibility effects between horizontal stimuli and vertical responses do not 
occur under the conditions observed in the present experiments. Lippa (1996) 
compared transverse horizontal hand responses (see Figure 10, labelled as vertical in
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Lippa, 1996), to horizontal stimuli (and vice versa). Orthogonal compatibility was 
only demonstrated in situations where hand position encouraged implicit coding of 
the non-veridical orthogonal dimension. In situations where stimulus and response 
positions were most equivalent to those used in the present experiments, orthogonal 
compatibility was not found (see also Michaels & Schilder, 1991, midline 
experiment).
While it is clear that in Experiment 8  incompatible, or counter-imitative, training 
resulted in the removal o f the movement compatibility effect, the implications for 
theories o f imitation are less obvious. It has been suggested by a number o f 
researchers (Brass et al., 2001, Chapter 1; Prinz, 1997) that the movement 
compatibility effect is based on the same processes as imitation; that both involve a 
motor representation being activated upon action perception. If this is correct, then 
factors affecting movement compatibility can be construed as affecting the processes 
that normally mediate imitation. This experiment found that that the movement 
compatibility effect is modifiable through experience. By implication, it is suggested 
that the imitation system is also open to modification by experience.
Experience-dependent changes to the processes which mediate imitation would be 
consistent with ASL and Ideomotor theories but not with AIM, which postulates that 
imitation is mediated by an innate cognitive module. However, it is possible that the 
processes which mediate imitation are unaffected in this experiment. Instead, short­
term counter-imitative effects o f training may compete for control o f action with the 
processes o f imitation and mask the normal movement compatibility effect. These 
short-term effects would speed incompatible responses while the normal processes of
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imitation would speed compatible responses. The net result would be the removal o f 
the movement compatibility effect in the absence o f any change to the normal 
imitative process. Such a situation could occur whether the imitation system is innate 
or experience-based.
In considering whether short-term, task-specific factors or modification o f imitative 
processes are responsible for these results, reference can be made to previous work on 
modification o f spatial compatibility effects through training (Tagliabue et al., 2000). 
Tagliabue et al used connectionist modelling to investigate whether their results were 
due to short-term, task-specific factors, or to a modification o f existing long-term 
SRC effects. They reasoned as follows: If incompatible training weakens long-term 
associations responsible for SRC effects (Figure 16d), or establishes new long-term 
links between incompatible stimuli and responses (Figure 16c), then the relationship 
between response speed and the SRC effect should not change. Stimulus presentation 
would activate long-term links which affect responding in a consistent manner as RT 
changes. If long-term links usually show an increasing affect on behaviour as RT 
increases, then a weakening o f those links would still result in an increasing affect on 
behaviour as RT increases but the magnitude of the difference between compatible 
and incompatible trials would be smaller.
In contrast, if  training effects are short-term (Figure 16, a and b), then the effect of 
incompatible training should increase with RT and thus change the relationship 
between the SRC effect and response speed. This is because short-term effects are 
slower to affect behaviour than long-term effects, and so their effect would increase as 
RT increases. This would be true whether short-term effects are mediated by
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Figure 16 -  Possible effects of counter-imitative training: (a) and (b) illustrate the formation 
of short-term associations on a modular imitative system (a), and on an associative-leaming 
based imitative system (b). Illustrations (c) and (d) portray the effects of counter-imitative 
training on long-term imitative associations, (c) portrays the formation of new long-term 
counter-imitative association, while (d) illustrates a weakening of long-term imitative 
association. (Dashed line - short-term association, unbroken line - long-term association, oval 
-  perceptual representation, rectangle -  motor representation).
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stimulus-response associations or a carry-over o f task instructions. Effects are slow as 
stimuli have to processed for relevance to the current task before activating the 
relevant response (S-R association explanation), or because conscious responses made 
to stimuli are slower than automatic (for supporting evidence see e.g. Brass et al., 
2000).
Data from Experiment 8 , and from the studies o f Brass, Bekkering and Prinz (2001) 
and from Sturmer, Aschersleben and Prinz (2000), suggest that movement 
compatibility effects increase with RT. If the relationship between the movement 
compatibility effect and RT is inputted into the model used by Tagliabue et al, then 
the following predictions are drawn: If incompatible training produces short-term 
effects then the movement compatibility effect should show a smaller increase with 
RT compared to the situation where incompatible training has not been given. 
Alternatively, if  the effect o f incompatible training is to weaken long-term 
associations, then the overall movement compatibility effect should be smaller, but 
increase with RT in the same manner as the group which received compatible 
training.
Results of Experiment 8  favour the interpretation that incompatible training affected 
the long-term mechanism responsible for producing the movement compatibility 
effect. Although the overall compatibility effect was smaller for the group which 
received incompatible training, the effect still increased as RT increased, and this 
increase was the same as shown by the group which received compatible training.
This interpretation is justified according to the model o f Tagliabue et al (2000), but it 
rests on a null effect (that the bin x group x trial type interaction is not significant).
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Although this was the case in our experiment (F(2,36) < 1) a low sample size meant that 
statistical power was extremely low (0.1). Therefore, this result should be viewed 
with caution until a further experiment with greater statistical power can be 
performed.
Further evidence suggesting that the results of Experiment 8 were not due to 
incompatible short-term associations comes from the literature on task switching.
Task switching refers to situations where a task is performed with one set o f stimulus- 
response (S-R) mappings, and then another task is performed with competing S-R 
mappings. It is generally observed that there is an RT cost upon transfer to the new S- 
R mappings (e.g. Allport, Styles, & Hsieh, 1994; Fagot, 1994). An RT cost o f this 
kind could be responsible for the reduction in the compatibility effect seen in 
Experiment 8 after incompatible training. Participants in group IT first perform a task 
with one set o f (incompatible) S-R mappings and then perform a task with opposite 
(compatible) S-R mappings. It is possible that the reduction in the movement 
compatibility effect is a result o f changing S-R mappings from training to test, and 
does not reflect alteration o f a long-term imitation system. This task-switching 
explanation is plausible in the light o f evidence that the cost o f task switching is 
mediated by negative priming o f the previously compatible response (and thus could 
explain why incompatible training has a greater effect on compatible trials than 
incompatible trials in Experiment 8) and has been observed over 100 trials o f the 
second task (Allport & Wylie, 2000).
However, one feature o f the RT cost of task switching means it is unlikely to explain 
the results o f Experiment 8. The task switching RT cost decays extremely rapidly over
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a small number o f trials (Allport & Wylie, 2000). If task switching was responsible 
for the effects observed in Experiment 8 , different effects should be seen in block 1 
(the first 72 trials), and block 2 (trials 73-144). This is because large costs o f task 
switching should be observed in the first few trials of block 1 , but these effects would 
decay rapidly and be small on later trials. This difference in effects over blocks would 
be manifested as a significant block x group x trial type interaction, and yet this 
interaction was not significant in Experiment 8  (F(i,ig) < 1), Again, caution is 
necessary in interpreting the absence of an interaction with low statistical power 
(0.12), but the absence o f this interaction supports the conclusion drawn from the RT 
distribution analysis presented above.
In conclusion. The experiments reported here have made some progress in 
investigating whether imitation is based on an innate module, or an experience-based 
system. The movement compatibility effect was used as a measure o f imitative 
strength, due to its presumed reliance on the same system that mediates imitation. 
Experiment 7 demonstrated a movement compatibility effect while controlling for 
simple spatial compatibility while Experiment 8  investigated the susceptibility of this 
effect to counter-imitative training. It was found that counter-imitative training 
reduced the movement compatibility effect but did not change its distribution over 
length o f RT. Two competing hypotheses as to the cause o f the disappearance o f the 
movement compatibility were discussed; that incompatible training resulted in the 
modification o f the long-term movement compatibility effect, or that short-term, task- 
specific effects masked the movement compatibility effect. Reference to a modified 
model o f spatial compatibility following incompatible training originally proposed by 
Tagliabue et al (2000), and the literature on ‘task-switching’, favoured the former
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hypothesis. The hypothesis that incompatible training modified the movement 
compatibility effect is consistent with the conclusion that imitation is based on 
experience-dependent processes, and favours the ASL or Ideomotor theories o f 
imitation.
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5.1 Overview
This chapter discusses the results o f the experiments reported in this thesis with 
reference to the theories o f imitation presented in Chapter 1. The three theoretical 
differences described in Chapter 1 and investigated in Chapters 2, 3, and 4 are 
separately addressed. The first o f these is whether effector-dependant learning can 
occur through observation (Section 5.2). The second is concerned with the role of 
awareness in imitation (Section 5.3). The third difference relates to the role of 
experience in imitation (Section 5.4). Within each section; results from the present 
experiments are summarised (subsection 1 ), their implications with respect to theories 
o f imitation are discussed (subsection 2 ), any limitations of the experiments are 
presented (subsection 3), and outstanding questions are detailed (subsection 4). 
Section 5.5 presents the conclusions about the mechanisms o f imitation which can be 
made from the results o f experiments reported in this thesis.
5.2 Effector-dependent Learning by Observation
5.2.1 Summary
Experiments 1 - 3  (Chapter 2) aimed to establish whether effector-dependent motor 
representations could be formed by observation o f a movement sequence using the 
SRT task o f Nissen and Bullemer (1987). The stimulus sequence upon which 
participants were trained in these experiments was six-items in length and had a 
unique structure. In all experiments, participants who had the opportunity to acquire 
sequence knowledge by observing a model’s responses were compared with control 
participants who had no opportunity to learn the sequence during training. Initial tests
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detected any sequence knowledge. Transfer tests were designed in order to determine 
how any sequence knowledge had been encoded by disambiguating learning o f motor 
responses and, stimulus (Experiments 1 and 2), or response (Experiment 3), locations.
The results o f all three experiments indicate that participants who observed a model’s 
responses learned the sequence in an effector-dependent fashion, i.e. sequence 
knowledge could not be expressed with effectors other than those observed during 
training. In addition, the results o f free generation (Experiment 1), and recognition 
(Experiment 2), tests suggest that participants who learned the sequence through 
observation were aware o f what they had learned.
5.2.2 Interpretation
Experiments 1 - 3  were designed to discover whether effector-dependent 
representations could be formed through observation of a novel movement sequence. 
Results indicated that sequence knowledge gained through observation could only be 
expressed using the effectors which had been used by the model. Thus, observation of 
a novel finger-movement sequence prompted the formation o f effector-dependent 
motor representations in the observer.
This finding is difficult to reconcile with the AIM and Ideomotor theories of 
imitation, but is predicted by the ASL model. The ASL model states that, under some 
circumstances, action observation may lead to a motor representation o f the observed 
action being activated without intermediate representation. These observation- 
activated motor representations will be effector-dependent providing that the observed 
action has been consistently linked with a single, distinct set o f muscles. The
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formation o f effector-dependent motor representations through observation is 
incompatible with the AIM and Ideomotor theories because o f their assertion that 
action representations are subject to (AIM), or accompanied by (Ideomotor), flexible, 
higher-order encoding which should enable performance o f an observed movement 
with any effector.
5.2.3 Limitations
Experiments 1 and 2 attempted to determine both the level o f effector-dependence and 
awareness o f information gained through observation o f a movement sequence. Both 
experiments included transfer tests to discover the nature of sequence representations. 
Experiment 1 included a generation test and Experiment 2 included a recognition test 
in order to identify how aware participants were o f their sequence knowledge. The 
results o f these experiments indicated that participants’ knowledge was stored as 
explicit effector-dependent motor representations. Three factors, both theoretical and 
methodological, make the observed pattern o f results unlikely.
The first is that if  participants are aware of their knowledge, then one would not 
expect the constraint on expression of this knowledge seen with effector-dependent 
motor representations. Knowledge o f which we are consciously aware should always 
be flexible and open to recoding, a line of argument which has led theorists such as 
Hikosaka et al (2002) to argue that effector-dependent representations must always be 
implicit. If  this argument is accepted then one must look to methodological flaws in 
the experimental design which may have caused this erroneous combination o f 
results.
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Two weaknesses in the designs of Experiments 1 and 2 may have produced these 
results. The first relates to the combination o f transfer and awareness tests in the same 
experiment. The order o f transfer tests and the test o f awareness was not 
counterbalanced; consequently the test o f awareness was open to contamination as a 
result o f participants having performed the transfer tests. It is quite possible that 
learning was initially effector-dependent and implicit, but that completion o f the 
transfer tests caused sequence knowledge to become explicit. While the order o f the 
transfer tests and the test o f awareness should have been counterbalanced in order to 
provide an opportunity to identify any effects o f test order, the fixed order o f these 
tests reflected the primary aim o f these experiments which was to discover the level of 
effector-dependence o f sequence knowledge. As a result o f this focus, transfer tests 
were always completed before the test o f awareness. Experiments 4 - 6 , in which the 
primary aim was to assess how aware participants were o f their sequence knowledge, 
did not include transfer tests to avoid any such effect on awareness.
The second methodological flaw which may have produced the combination o f 
effector-dependence and explicit knowledge found in experiments 1 and 2  relates to 
the tests o f awareness. Both o f the tests used in these experiments may indicate 
explicit knowledge when knowledge is actually implicit. Knowledge is judged to be 
explicit on the free generation test when participants are successfully able to generate 
the training sequence without being cued by stimuli. However, successful production 
o f the sequence may be based not on explicit knowledge, but on an implicit motor 
program which is ‘run’ without conscious awareness of the contents o f the motor 
program.
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Explicit knowledge is demonstrated on the recognition test when participants respond 
faster to training than new sequences and also rate training sequence fragments as 
more familiar than new sequences. However, such a pattern o f results is also possible 
when knowledge is implicit. In this case successful recognition performance could be 
based on a ‘feeling of fluency’ (Shanks and Johnstone, 1999). This would involve 
participants recognising that they respond faster to some (training) sequences, (which 
may be based on implicit motor knowledge), and rating these sequences as more 
familiar. This process would produce successful recognition performance without 
participants being aware o f their sequence knowledge.
Despite these weaknesses, the generation and recognition tests are the most widely 
used test o f awareness, especially in combination with an SRT task (Russeler, 
Henninghausen, Munte, & Rosier, 2003), and Shanks and St John (1994) have argued 
that the recognition test is the most sensitive o f all current tests o f awareness. These 
two factors caused these tests to be used in Experiments 1 and 2, and the recognition 
test to be used in Experiments 5 and 6 , where the primary research focus was on 
participants’ level o f awareness. Indeed, the limitations o f the recognition test in 
indicating implicit knowledge make the suggestion o f implicit learning shown by 
observers o f a model’s response in Experiments 5 and 6  all the more striking.
5.2.4 Outstanding Questions
An important question which has not been answered by this thesis relates to the 
conditions under which effector-dependent learning can occur by observation. ASL 
claims that learning will be effector-dependent when motor representations which 
code for a distinct set o f muscles are activated by perceptual information without
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intermediate symbolic representation. This claim merits further investigation, perhaps 
by assessing the nature o f information processing which occurs in instructed imitation 
experiments (“Do as I do”), such as that o f Bekkering, Wohlschlager, and Gattis 
(2000). It has been demonstrated that, at least in infants, effector-dependent 
representations are not usually formed under these circumstances. The reasons why an 
instruction to imitate should affect the encoding o f observed movements has not been 
explicitly addressed by ASL, and merits further investigation.
5.3 The Role of Awareness in Imitation
5.3.1 Summary
Experiments 4 - 6  (Chapter 3) aimed to determine whether observational sequence 
learning could be implicit. The SRT task was used in these experiments but, in 
contrast to experiments in Chapter 2, the sequence to be learned was twelve items in 
length and had a second-order conditional (SOC) structure. Experiment 4 compared 
sequence knowledge gained through observation o f screen stimuli and a model’s 
responses, and observation o f screen stimuli alone, with untrained controls. Results 
showed no difference between observers o f screen stimuli alone and observers of 
screen stimuli and a model’s responses. Both groups o f observers demonstrated 
greater sequence knowledge than untrained controls i.e. they exhibited observational 
sequence learning o f a 12-item SOC sequence.
Experiment 5 sought to compare the magnitude o f learning gained through task 
practice with observation o f stimuli alone and observation o f stimuli and a model’s 
responses. In addition, a recognition test was used to determine how aware
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participants were o f any sequence knowledge they had gained. Results implied that 
observational training led to sequence knowledge which was equal in magnitude to 
that gained through physical practice. Results o f the recognition test suggested that 
participants were aware o f sequence knowledge gained through physical practice and 
observation of screen stimuli alone, but were not aware of sequence information 
gained through observation o f screen stimuli and a model’s responses.
Experiment 6  investigated whether observation o f a model’s responses, but not screen 
stimuli, could support learning of a 12-item SOC sequence, and whether participants 
were aware o f any sequence knowledge gained through this type o f observational 
training. Results showed that observers o f a model’s response gained more sequence 
knowledge than untrained controls. Additionally, results suggested that sequence 
knowledge gained through response observation was implicit; i.e. that participants 
were unaware o f their sequence knowledge.
5.3.2 Interpretation
Experiments 4 - 6  investigated the level o f awareness which accompanies 
observational learning o f a movement sequence. Results implied that observation o f a 
movement sequence could support learning o f the sequence and that participants had 
learned implicitly. Such a characteristic o f observational motor learning is 
incompatible with the AIM model, but is consistent with both the ASL and Ideomotor 
theories o f imitation.
Implicit learning by imitation is inconsistent with the AIM model due to its reliance 
on active, effortful processing. The AIM model claims that the desired and actual
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states of the imitator’s body are actively compared to produce a movement target. The 
desired state o f the imitator’s body is obtained by inferring the model’s action goals 
from their movements. It is possible that such active, effortful processing may lead to 
learning which is implicit, particularly in situations where task characteristics mean 
explicit learning is unlikely to occur. However these experiments were not an 
example o f such a task. The Practice and Observe Screen groups showed explicit 
knowledge of the sequence, showing that explicit learning was possible under these 
experimental conditions. AIM would predict that the groups most likely to develop 
explicit knowledge would be the Observe Screen and Hands, and Observe Hands 
groups, due to their active effortful processing o f the movement stimuli. However, 
both o f these groups showed some evidence of implicit knowledge when tested.
In contrast, both ASL and Ideomotor theories posit that imitation may occur without 
conscious representation. In both o f these theories, visual action percepts may activate 
motor (ASL), or action (Ideomotor), representations directly, without the need for 
conscious effortful processing. In such situations learning by imitation will be 
implicit.
5.3.3 Limitations
Experiments 1 - 3  investigated whether observation of a movement sequence would 
enable the observer to learn the sequence, and if  so, how the sequence was 
represented. The sequence used in these experiments was short and had a simple 
structure. This type of sequence was chosen for practical reasons. As the aim o f the 
experiments was to determine whether it was possible to form effector-dependent
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representations through observation, experimental parameters were guided by the only 
experiment in the literature to report this type of learning (Heyes and Foster, 2002).
Experiments 4 - 6  aimed to discover whether sequence knowledge gained through 
observation could be implicit. These experiments used a longer sequence with a more 
complex structure than those in Chapter 2. Again, the type o f sequence used in these 
experiments was chosen for practical reasons. The overwhelming majority o f studies 
reporting implicit practice-based sequence learning had used 10 or 12-item sequences 
with a complex structure (e.g. Exner, Koschack, & Irle, 2002; Kelly & Burton, 2001; 
Reber & Squire, 1998).
While the choice o f sequences used in Experiments 1 - 6  maximised the chances of 
obtaining useful data, comparisons between the results of experiments investigating 
effector-dependence and those investigating awareness of sequence knowledge are 
problematic due to the different sequences used in the experiments. Such a 
comparison would have been especially beneficial in explaining the suggestion that 
observation o f a model’s response may have produced implicit sequence knowledge. 
An explanation of these results was forwarded which rests on the assumption that 
observation o f a model’s response produced implicit motor learning. Although 
experiments 1 -3  suggest that motor representations can be formed through 
observation o f a model’s responses, and experiments 4 - 6  suggest that sequence 
knowledge gained through observation of a model’s responses can be implicit, the 
differences in sequence length and structure between the two sets o f experiments 
means that results cannot be combined. Thus, these results do not show that implicit
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motor learning can occur through observation o f a model’s responses, although they 
suggest that such learning may be possible.
A full investigation of effector-dependence and awareness o f sequence knowledge 
gained through observation would include both issues being investigated using unique 
and complex sequences. Unfortunately a lack o f time and space prevented such an 
investigation being included here, but is recommended for future investigation. Such 
an extension o f the present experiments would not only provide a more thorough and 
general answer to the questions of effector-dependence and awareness of 
observational sequence learning, but may also have important theoretical 
implications. Several studies have demonstrated differential effects o f a number of 
variables on learning o f complex and unique sequences. These differences include 
effects of; a secondary task on learning (Cohen, Ivry, & Keele, 1990 experiments 3 
and 4), age on learning competence (Howard & Howard, 2001; Howard & Howard, 
1997), the intention to learn (Curran & Keele, 1993), and o f observation on learning 
(Howard, Mutter, & Howard, 1992). If  sequence structure affects either the effector- 
dependence or awareness o f sequence information gained through movement 
observation, then theories o f imitation must be able to explain such an effect.
A feature o f experiments 1 - 6  which deviates from standard practice-based SRT 
research is the lack o f sequence counter-balancing. Many experimenters 
counterbalance training and new sequences to avoid confounding sequence type 
(training vs. new), with sequence difficulty (e.g. Schvaneveldt & Gomez, 1998). In 
most studies o f practice-based learning an effect of sequence type on RT is looked 
for, learning is demonstrated by faster responses to training compared to new
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sequences. Sequence counterbalancing is important for these experiments as any 
increase in RT from training to new sequences may be caused by differences in the 
ease o f sequence production rather than sequence knowledge. However, the present 
experiments compare groups o f observers with groups of control participants who 
have no opportunity to learn the sequence. Learning due to observation is indexed by 
a greater increase in RT upon transfer to the new sequence shown by observers, 
compared to that shown by controls. With this type o f experimental design a 
difference in ease o f production between training and new sequences would be less 
likely to produce spurious results as both groups o f participants should be affected 
equally. However, differences in the ease of production o f training and new sequences 
may affect the amount o f learning shown through observation by introducing floor or 
ceiling effects which may mask the effects o f observational learning. The generality 
o f experiments 1 - 6  would have been increased had training and new sequences been 
counterbalanced and different pairs o f training and new sequences been used for each 
experiment.
5.3.4 Outstanding Questions
An interesting question that has not been answered by the experiments in this thesis 
concerns the relationship between the level o f effector-dependence and awareness of 
representations formed through action observation. Hikosaka et al (2002) have argued 
that effector-dependent motor representations are necessarily implicit. The results of 
Experiments 1 -  6 in Chapters 2 and 3 are ambivalent with respect to a relationship 
between these two properties. While Experiments 2 and 3 seemed to suggest that the 
observational sequence learning demonstrated in these experiments was explicit and 
effector-dependent, methodological problems cast doubt on the results o f the tests of
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awareness. Differences in the length and structure of sequences used in Chapters 2 
and 3 mean that the results o f experiments investigating effector-dependence cannot 
be generalised to those testing awareness o f learned information, and vice versa. 
However, the results o f experiments in Chapter 2 suggest effector-dependent motor 
learning can occur through observation. If one accepts the arguments o f Hikosaka et 
al (2002), these results can explain the difference in sequence awareness between 
observers o f inanimate stimuli and human movement seen in Experiments 5 and 6.
Future experiments should aim to obtain valid measures o f effector-dependence and 
awareness o f observational learning in order to investigate this question. One possible 
mechanism for such testing would be to use two modified recognition tests. The tests 
would follow the format o f the recognition tests used in the present experiments i.e. 
old and new sequences would be executed and then rated. However, in one o f the 
recognition tests participants would respond using the same effectors as during 
training but to different stimuli, and in the other test training stimuli would be 
presented to which participants respond with effectors other than those upon which 
they were trained. Such tests would provide a method o f testing both the level of 
effector-dependence, and awareness, o f participants’ sequence knowledge
5.4 The Role of Experience in Imitation
5.4.1 Summary
Experiments 7 and 8 (Chapter 4) provide an initial investigation o f the susceptibility 
of the movement compatibility effect to counter-imitative training. Experiment 7 
established the existence of a movement compatibility effect which was
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unconfounded with spatial compatibility. Hand movements were performed upon 
detection o f movement o f a hand presented on a computer screen. The stimulus hand 
either demonstrated a matching (compatible trials), or non-matching (incompatible 
trials), movement. RT on compatible trials was significantly faster than on 
incompatible trials.
Participants in Experiment 8 received either compatible or incompatible training 
before completing the same task as those in Experiment 7. Training involved a choice 
RT task in which participants responded to observed stimulus movement with either a 
matching (compatible training), or a non-matching (incompatible training), 
movement. On test, participants who had received compatible training did, but those 
who had received incompatible training did not, exhibit the movement compatibility 
effect shown in Experiment 7.
5.4.2 Interpretation
Experiments 7 and 8 investigated the role of experience in imitation. Results of these 
experiments lead to the conclusion that the system responsible for imitation is 
susceptible to training, and therefore experience-dependent. This issue clearly 
separates the AIM model from ASL and Ideomotor theories, as the AIM model 
suggests that imitation is mediated by an innate cognitive module. The finding that the 
imitation system can be modified through a small amount o f counter-imitative 
experience is not compatible with an innate, hard-wired view o f imitation. Such an 
effect o f training on imitation would be predicted by both the ASL and Ideomotor 
theories however. These theories contend that imitative ability is developed through 
learning: The ASL model argues that perceptual and motor representations o f actions
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become associated, while Ideomotor Theory argues that associations must be formed 
between actions and their effects.
5.4.3 Limitations
Experiment 8 showed that incompatible training can result in the removal o f a 
previously observed movement compatibility effect (Experiment 7). Discussion of 
these results focussed on whether incompatible training had modified the normal 
process o f imitation responsible for producing the movement compatibility effect, or 
had formed incompatible short-term associations which masked the normal 
compatibility effect. Although it was concluded that the long-term imitation system 
had been modified by incompatible training, this conclusion rested on the absence of 
two interactions. Power analysis indicated that these results had very low statistical 
power, and thus were unlikely to detect any significant effect present. While this 
indicates that a further experiment should be run which replicates Experiment 8 with 
greater numbers o f participants, it should be noted that retrospective power analysis 
has been severely criticised by a number o f statisticians due to its direct inverse 
relationship with the observed significance o f an effect. Thus, if  an observed alpha 
value approaches 0, then observed power will approach 1. Conversely, as observed 
alpha increases, so observed power will decrease (e.g. Lenth, 2001; Hoenig & Heisy, 
2001).
An alternative approach is to compare the number o f participants per group in 
Experiment 8 (ten) with other experiments which have demonstrated movement 
compatibility effects. Clearly most directly comparable is Experiment 7, which also 
used ten participants per group. Other experiments demonstrating movement
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compatibility effects have generally used less participants than the present 
experiments (Brass et al, 2000, n = 8; Brass et al, 2001, n = 8; Sturmer et al, 2000, n = 
8-10) .  Although these experiments did not investigate the impact o f counter- 
imitative training on a movement compatibility effect, they do illustrate that the 
number o f participants in Experiment 8 was consistent with related experiments 
reported in the literature.
5.4.4 Outstanding Questions
These results clearly favour an experience-based model o f imitation which relies on 
learning. If  imitation relies on learning then neonates should be severely limited in 
their capacity to imitate. As shown in Chapter 1, there is considerable debate over 
whether imitation has been shown in neonates, with several laboratories claiming to 
have demonstrated neonatal imitation (e.g. Field, Goldstein, Vaga-Lahr, & Porter, 
1986; Field et al., 1983; Meltzoff & Moore, 1977, 1983, 1994), and several 
laboratories claiming that the evidence is flawed or inconclusive (e.g. Anisfeld 1991, 
1996, 2001, in press, Couturier-Fagan 1996). The experiments reported in this thesis 
would suggest that neonatal imitation should be extremely limited, but only if 
neonatal imitation is governed by the same system as adult imitation. While it may be 
parsimonious to suggest that neonatal and adult imitation are the product o f one 
system, some evidence exists which suggests that this assumption may not be correct. 
This includes research which has revealed that the imitative ability demonstrated by 
neonates and infants within the first weeks o f life disappears by 3 months for normal 
children, and by 4 months for children with Down’s syndrome (Heimann, Ullstadius 
& Swerlander, 1998; Heimann, Nelson & Schaller, 1989), and that which shows that
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neonatal imitative ability is unrelated to imitative ability at 1 year o f age (Heimann & 
Ullstadius, 1999).
5.5 Conclusions
This set o f results strongly favours the ASL theory of imitation, with Ideomotor 
Theory also being well supported. None of the results obtained in this study support 
the characterisation of imitation described by the AIM model. This enables us to 
compare the AIM model with the other theories to identify some features of the 
imitation system revealed by the experiments contained in this thesis. The two main 
differences between the ASL and Ideomotor, and AIM theories o f imitation are the 
roles o f experience and awareness. These results favour an experience-based model o f 
imitation which is not solely reliant on conscious, effortful processing. Consequently, 
any model o f imitation must be able to account for the adaptive nature o f imitative 
responses, and include the capacity for automatic imitation.
The main difference between the ASL and Ideomotor theories o f imitation is the 
structure o f the representation which controls action. Ideomotor theory states that this 
representation contains all effects of performing the action coded on a number of 
levels. Thus, simple visual descriptions o f the movement will be included in the 
representation, as will goals o f the movement, and symbolic representations. In 
contrast, the ASL model posits that representations activated through perception 
contain only motor commands necessary to produce the action and proprioceptive 
information received when the movement is performed.
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It is this difference in representation structure which prompts the differential 
prediction of effector-dependence through observation. If  an Ideomotor representation 
is activated, then information will be available to guide production with any effector, 
due to the inclusion o f higher-order cognitive representations in the action 
representation. However, if  the motor representation described by ASL theory is 
activated, then this representation will be specific to one effector.
The difference between the ASL and Ideomotor theories is based on differences in 
action representations, not on the mechanisms of imitation which allow the 
correspondence problem to be solved. Both theories suggest that the correspondence 
problem is solved by learning of bi-directional association between representations 
necessary to produce imitative actions, and their effects on the environment. The ASL 
theory is solely concerned with perceptual representations o f the action, while 
Ideomotor Theory suggests that representations contain action effects on a number of 
perceptual and cognitive levels.
In summary: This thesis has assessed three theories o f imitation concerned with 
solving the correspondence problem: Associative Sequence Learning (Heyes and Ray, 
2000), Ideomotor Theory (e.g. Prinz, 1997), and Active Intermodal Mapping (e.g. 
Meltzoff and Moore, 1997). These theories were evaluated based on their predictions 
of; effector-dependent learning through movement observation, awareness of 
information learned through imitation, and the role o f experience in imitation. Results 
supported the combination of an experience-based imitation system which can operate 
without awareness described by the Associative Sequence Learning and Ideomotor 
theories o f imitation. Furthermore, the representational structure described by the
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Associative Sequence Learning Theory was found to be more plausible than that 
described by Ideomotor Theory, at least in the context o f imitation o f novel actions.
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